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Does Sustainability Require a New Theory of 
Property Rights? 
Carl J. Circo∗ 
Cursed be thy stones for thus deceiving me.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Will future generations damn us for what we have valued most?  
Does our reverence for private property threaten “the ability of the future 
generations to meet their own needs?”2  Will our growing commitment to 
sustainability force us to restrict individual property rights or, more 
happily, will it teach us that ecological efficiency is the most effective 
capitalist strategy? 
In pursuing these questions, this Article examines the potential 
conflicts between sustainability theory and property theory.  Part II 
briefly surveys sustainability concepts, both in theory and in practice.  It 
begins by identifying three main theoretical strains: resource 
conservation; generational justice; and social justice.  The remainder of 
Part II examines a few specific applications of sustainability to illustrate 
how sustainability objectives may conflict with common understandings 
of private property rights in contemporary U.S. society.  To put the 
potential conflict between sustainability and property rights in broad 
conceptual contexts, Part III contrasts selected theoretical themes from 
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 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A MIDSUMMER NIGHT’S DREAM, in THE COMPLETE WORKS 351, 
373 (Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor gen. eds., 1986).  With this curse, Shakespeare’s comic character, 
Bottom, speaking in an amusingly short play within a play, discovered the same apparent dilemma 
that bedevils sustainable development: human design and labor may promise happiness, yet 
ultimately deliver despair.  Bottom came to a simple stone wall believing in vain that it would yield 
a blissful glimpse of his beloved Thisbe. 
 2. WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV, OUR COMMON FUTURE 8 (1987). 
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three competing property perspectives, giving particular attention to 
those most relevant to sustainability programs.  The three theoretical 
themes—here designated traditional, economic, and relational—provide 
different capacities to accommodate sustainability.  Part IV samples 
property theory and sustainability theory as reflected in a few 
contemporary legislative and judicial decisions.  Part V considers what 
concessions sustainability may eventually demand of property theory. 
In the final analysis, the extent to which sustainability requires a new 
theory of property rights for the United States depends both on what 
model of sustainability ultimately prevails in this country and on the 
degree to which property rights doctrine clings to traditional and 
economic notions.  Traditional and economic theories of property will 
accommodate mild versions of sustainability, but not stronger ones.  
While the principles that inform traditional theories should permit 
expanded limits on private property rights in the interest of conserving 
resources both for today and, to a point, for the protection of remote 
generations, they do not easily adapt to the social justice objectives of the 
international sustainability movement.  Economic calculations also take 
into account the value of resource conservation for the present and into 
the near future, but their ability to apply the calculus to more remote 
generations depends on the skill of environmental economists to develop 
compelling new tools to value human welfare over time.  Moreover, the 
social justice objectives of sustainability seem intrinsically incompatible 
with the leading versions of economic analysis.  The net result may well 
be that U.S. concepts of private property cannot fully conform to 
sustainability without a distinct shift to relational perspectives that 
currently exist only at the fringes of property theory as applied in this 
country. 
II. SUSTAINABILITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
A. Sustainability Theory 
Many sustainability advocates have noted the fluid attributes of the 
ecological concept they advance.3  Some even argue that the language of 
sustainability often operates merely as political rhetoric without 
                                                     
 3. See, e.g., STEVEN C. HACKETT, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES ECONOMICS: 
THEORY, POLICY, AND THE SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 391 (3d ed. 2006) (“The concept of sustainable 
development is broad and has come to mean different things to different people.”); Michael Redclift, 
Sustainable Development: Concepts, Contradictions, and Conflicts, in FOOD FOR THE FUTURE: 
CONDITIONS AND CONTRADICTIONS OF SUSTAINABILITY 169, 170–71 (Patricia Allen ed., 1993). 
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substance.4  To some, sustainability primarily refers to energy efficiency5 
or to the slightly broader principles of efficient resource conservation.6  
To others, sustainability requires radical changes in our social and 
political institutions.7  Indeed, some proponents of sustainable 
development argue for “socially just development world-wide”8 that 
“should attempt to address important social and political issues related to 
the inequitable allocation of the world’s resources.”9  Still others 
envision sustainability as a fundamental human right.10 
As a prelude to an analysis of the relationship between sustainability 
and property rights under U.S. law, the discussion that follows briefly 
surveys alternative theoretical perspectives from the sustainability 
literature.  In the interest of maintaining a manageable framework for the 
ultimate evaluation in Part V, this overview deliberately ignores some of 
the subtle differences reflected in the extensive literature on 
sustainability to arrive at three contrasting theoretical models: resource 
conservation, generational justice, and social justice.  Each model is 
introduced below in the order of their increasing potential to threaten 
private property rights. 
1. Resource Conservation 
Conventional environmentalism provides the essential theory for 
resource conservation.  From this perspective, ecologically sustainable 
actions are both utilitarian and ethical in an a priori sense.  As a purely 
utilitarian matter, the theory holds that society should maximize the 
value of natural resources for the common good by using those resources 
                                                     
 4. Philip R. Berke & Maria Manta Conroy, Are We Planning for Sustainable Development? 
An Evolution of 30 Comprehensive Plans, 66 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N 21, 22 (2000). 
 5. See, e.g., CHARLES J. KIBERT, SUSTAINABLE CONSTRUCTION: GREEN BUILDING DESIGN 
AND DELIVERY 1–3 (2005) (discussing depletion of oil reserves and the cost of fossil-fuel and 
natural gas intensive buildings). 
 6. See, e.g., id. at 9–12 (discussing sustainable construction); HACKETT, supra note 3, at 403 
(stating that sustainability focuses on the future). 
 7. See, e.g., HACKETT, supra note 3, at 327–28, 398–99 (discussing the integration of “social 
justice, poverty alleviation, and environmental preservation and restoration”). 
 8. Nancy J. King & Brian J. King, Creating Incentives for Sustainable Buildings: A 
Comparative Law Approach Featuring the United States and the European Union, 23 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 397, 400 (2005) (quoting Paul Shrivastava & Stuart Hart, Creating Sustainable Corporations, 4 
BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 154, 155 (1995)). 
 9. Id. at 401. 
 10. See Dominic McGoldrick, Sustainable Development and Human Rights: An Integrated 
Conception, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 796, 798 (1996) (noting that protection of human rights was the 
first principle of the UN Conference on Environment and Development’s Rio Declaration). 
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efficiently and without gratuitous waste or contamination.11  In an ethical 
sense, sustainability as conservation may reflect an intuitive respect for 
nature that stems from a fundamental preference for resource protection 
and preservation.12  That theory may take its foundation either from 
traditional cultural13 and religious14 beliefs or from a secular value 
system.15 
The utilitarian and ethical variations on this theoretical approach 
matter in limited ways.  The utilitarian may argue that society should 
embrace sustainable development to the extent it can do so without 
incurring countervailing costs, which probably only refers to those costs 
that a sustainability program imposes on a particular local, regional, or 
national society.16  To the environmental ethicist sustainability is, at 
some level, an absolute virtue that overrides social cost.17  For example, 
it may be morally wrong for one social group to exhaust a finite and 
irreplaceable resource even if the benefits to that group are significant 
and the damage to other social groups is indeterminate.  Similarly, an 
ethical model might condemn a decision to exploit a natural resource that 
has significant aesthetic value. 
2. Generational Justice 
While conventional environmentalism considers the interests of 
future generations, some theoretical writings on the contemporary 
sustainability movement elevate this concern to a central position.18  A 
                                                     
 11. See HACKETT, supra note 3, at 325 (“[W]e can think of sustainable development as 
providing the support necessary for the functional elements of economy, community, and 
environment to achieve their full potential.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Timothy Beatley & Richard Collins, Smart Growth and Beyond: Transitioning to 
a Sustainable Society, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 287, 296–301 (2000) (asserting the intrinsic value of 
undeveloped land and discussing growing concern over our ecological footprint). 
 13. See, e.g., HACKETT, supra note 3, at 323 (“Many cultures over the course of human history 
have recognized the need for harmony between their economy, community, and environment.”). 
 14. See e.g., J. Ronald Engel, Introduction to ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
12–14 (J. Ronald Engel & Joan Gibb Engel eds., 1990) (discussing multiple religious theories). 
 15. See Samuel R. Staley, Institutional Considerations for Sustainable Development Policy 
Implementation: A U.S. Case Study, 24 PROP. MGMT. 232, 233–36 (2006) (discussing institutional 
and governmental effects on sustainability). 
 16. See Engel, supra note 14, at 10 (referring to “the common association of ‘sustainable 
development’ with the limited goal of resource conservation—growth with equity” as “the dominant 
Western paradigm”). 
 17. See Rajni Kothari, Environment, Technology, and Ethics, in ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 14, at 27, 33 (concluding that “if there is to be a moral imperative for 
sustainable development, there needs to be a sense of sanctity about the Earth”). 
 18. See Edith Brown Weiss, Intergenerational Equity: A Legal Framework for Global 
Environmental Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW 
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conventional environmentalist might accept generational relativism—
reasoning that development may proceed as long as it minimizes 
environmental damage in light of the demographic, economic, and 
technical circumstances prevailing at the time and place the development 
activity occurs.  By contrast, generational justice asserts that each 
generation must preserve natural resources at least to the extent 
necessary for future generations to benefit on a relatively equal basis 
with the current generation.19 
The most articulate statements of generational justice use the concept 
of natural capital.  Those scholars argue that natural capitalism should 
constitute a stable account for each generation to use but not exhaust or 
damage.20  This framework literally adopts Thomas Jefferson’s civil law 
property metaphor “that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living.”21  
This perspective insists that each generation must maintain not only the 
earth’s natural resources but also its capacity to service human activity.  
Sustainability utterly depends on natural capital, which is fragile and 
finite: 
 The natural capital stock usually is divided into three categories: 
non-renewable resources, such as mineral resources; the finite capacity 
of the natural system to produce “renewable resources” such as food 
crops and water supply; and the capacity of natural systems to absorb 
the emissions and pollutants that arise from human actions without side 
effects that imply heavy costs passed onto future generations.  Natural 
capital includes all natural assets; humans can alter it, and humans can 
enhance its reproduction, but humans cannot create it.22 
Whether or not those who advocate sustainability based on generational 
justice expressly use natural capital terminology, the central point is the 
same: The earth has finite resources and capacities that no generation has 
any right to take away from any future generation.  In its strongest form, 
generational justice may demand far greater restraint than conventional 
environmentalism.  For example, the traditional environmentalist may 
                                                                                                                       
CHALLENGES AND DIMENSIONS (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1991), reprinted in RICHARD L. REVESZ, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 309, 309–12 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997) 
(stating that conservation of resources is a basis of intergenerational equity and sustainability). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See generally Richard W. England, Should We Pursue Measurement of the Natural Capital 
Stock?, 27 ECOL. ECON. 257 (1998); Jan Geldrop & Cees Withagen, Natural Capital and 
Sustainability, 32 ECOL. ECON. 445 (2000).  
 21. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 454 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907) (emphasis in original). 
 22. Yosef Jabareen, A Knowledge Map for Describing Variegated and Conflict Domains of 
Sustainable Development, 47 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 623, 628 (2004) (citation omitted). 
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approve using exhaustible natural resources, such as minerals, if done 
efficiently and without contaminating other natural resources.23  But 
generational justice may dictate that a society should only use 
exhaustible natural resources if it can create or provide their functional—
and perhaps even their aesthetic—equivalent for the benefit of future 
generations through technology or some other means.24  As suggested by 
recurring references to the resources of the earth as a whole, generational 
justice often implies a global perspective, although globalism is not its 
defining characteristic.25 
3. Social Justice 
Generational justice aims to expand the human instinct for familial 
preservation by taking into account the human race as it extends to eras 
beyond any living individual’s personal experience.  But it does not 
necessarily insist on equality for the individuals comprising either the 
current generation or any distant one.  By contrast, the social justice 
model of sustainability seeks an eventual redistribution of the earth’s 
resources to achieve some minimal level of allocation to all individuals.26  
The most radical form of sustainability incorporates the tenets of global 
social justice.  Therefore, the object is not only to preserve the earth’s 
resources for future generations, but also to alter social institutions so in 
the future all societies and individuals will benefit from both natural and 
other resources more equitably.27 
The central argument for infusing sustainability with social justice is 
that current social institutions cannot be sustained indefinitely.28  While 
proponents of this approach do not always explicitly state the 
                                                     
 23. See, e.g., WOLFGANG SACHS, PLANET DIALECTICS: EXPLORATIONS IN ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT 27–42 (1999) (criticizing an environmental perspective that gives priority to a 
continuing right to development). 
 24. See Geldrop & Withagen, supra note 20, at 446–47 (discussing use of substitute products 
and technological innovation to ensure sustainable development). 
 25. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 18, at 309 (indicating that “[s]ustainable development rests on a 
commitment to equity with future generations” and reflects the principle that “each generation 
should be required to maintain the quality of the planet”). 
 26. See Arne Naess, Sustainable Development and Deep Ecology, in ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENT 
AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 14, at 87, 94–96. 
 27. See Redclift, supra note 3, at 188–90 (stating that current thought includes more 
environmental considerations that influence organizations and policymakers). 
 28. See Henri Acselrad, Sustainability and Territory: Meaningful Practices and Material 
Transformations, in SUSTAINABILITY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY 
APPROACH TO INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS INTO THEORETICAL 
REORIENTATION 37, 53–54 (Egon Becker & Thomas Jahn eds., 1999) (discussing the relationship 
between sustainability and intergenerational justice). 
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assumptions that inform this version of sustainability, their arguments 
frequently include a modern strain of socialist thought.29  They depart 
from generational justice by objecting that a trans-generational 
perspective alone fails to distinguish between the needs “of the global 
consumer class or those of the enormous masses of have-nots.”30 
But how is social justice in the form of distributive equity a matter of 
sustainability?  Why can a society or world that is unjust in a distributive 
sense not continue to reproduce itself indefinitely?31  Perhaps the implicit 
premise to connect equity in resource allocation with sustainability is that 
social institutions that fail to provide for the economic needs of all will 
inevitably fail, presumably because pressure from those in desperate 
need will force change either through democratic processes or violence.32 
International law expressly recognizes social justice as a basis to 
advance sustainability.33  Several United Nations documents advocating 
sustainable development espouse a global social justice rationale.  For 
example, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
proclaims “the essential task of eradicating poverty as an indispensable 
requirement for sustainable development.”34  Similarly, the Johannesburg 
Declaration on Sustainable Development asserts that “[t]he deep fault 
line that divides human society between the rich and the poor and the 
ever-increasing gap between the developed and developing worlds pose a 
major threat to global prosperity, security and stability.”35 
                                                     
 29. See generally, SACHS, supra note 23, at 159–74. 
 30. Id. at 160.  See also Andrew Harding, Access to Environmental Justice: Some Introductory 
Perspectives, in ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1, 3–11 (Andrew 
Harding ed., 2007) (discussing inequality in accessing gateways to environmental justice); Vicki 
Bean, What’s Fairness Got to do with it?: Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally 
Undesirable Land Uses, in REVESZ, supra note 18, at 112, 112–17 (discussing how discrimination 
can affect the siting of locally unwanted land use). 
 31. See Acselrad, supra note 28, at 55 (suggesting that reproducing indefinitely may be 
ethically wrong). 
 32. See Naess, supra note 26, at 95 (explaining that if the lifestyle of “the rich power elites in 
poor countries” does not change, the rich will be judged as “ecological and ethical misfits and 
violent reactions will result”). 
 33. See McGoldrick, supra note 10, at 798. 
 34. United Nations Conference of Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 
3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/151/26 
(1992); see also John R. Nolon, Comparative Land Use Law: Patterns of Sustainability, 37 URB. 
LAW. 807, 815–18 (2005). 
 35. World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, S. Afr., Aug. 26–Sept. 4, 2002, 
Report, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc A/CONF.199/20 (2002) [hereinafter Report on Sustainable Development]. 
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B. Sustainability in Practice—A Sampling of Initiatives Affecting 
Property Rights 
Commentators frequently note the lack of agreement on how best to 
implement sustainability.36  At least in part, this is inevitable because 
sustainability carries many different meanings.37  Indeed, some of the 
most prominent documents of the sustainability movement offer 
notoriously vague outlines of the specific actions required to achieve 
sustainability.  The Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development demonstrates this problem by offering an 
extensive list of broad goals that, by necessity, require interpretation by 
individual countries and agencies.38 
Will the global sustainability movement eventually lead to 
restrictions on private property rights as currently recognized in the 
United States?  Several economic development strategies suggest the 
possibility.  Long-standing proposals to reduce harmful industrial 
emissions, for example, include standards that could generate significant 
governmental controls over the use and development of private property, 
such as coal reserves.39  Similarly, calls to preserve natural capital 
involve significant limits on the property rights of those who own land or 
the rights to natural resources.40 
This part notes just a few examples of regulations and restrictions 
adopted or proposed in the name of sustainability that could, depending 
on one’s theoretical framework, conflict with private property rights.  
The goal here is not to catalogue points of conflict, but merely to place 
the potential tension between sustainability and property rights in a 
concrete context.  Examples taken from land use controls and forestry 
management will serve the purpose. 
1. Applying Sustainability Theory to Land Use 
In the United States, the sustainability movement has already 
spawned land use regulations.  The three examples mentioned here show 
                                                     
 36. See, e.g., McGoldrick, supra note 10, at 798–99; Acselrad, supra note 28, at 49. 
 37. Redclift, supra note 3, at 170–71. 
 38. See generally Report on Sustainable Development, supra note 35, at Annex ¶¶ 7–71. 
 39. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981), 
as reprinted in REVESZ, supra note 18, at 193, 193–200 (analyzing the effects of government 
regulations on coal mining companies). 
 40. See, e.g., Beatley & Collins, supra note 12, at 312–14 (suggesting that the United States 
should develop a “comprehensive large-scale integrated system of protected lands” to preserve 
natural capital). 
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that sustainability initiatives will sometimes clash with private property 
interests. 
a. Sustainable Construction Codes 
Concern for energy efficiency, which is a consistent theme of the 
sustainable development movement, has led to increasing attention on 
data showing the impact the built environment has on energy 
consumption and climate change.41  Potential improvements in the 
design, construction, use, and final disposition of buildings create 
opportunities for significantly increasing energy efficiency and reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions on a global basis.42  Among the most far-
reaching ideas are proposals for buildings that generate as much energy 
as they use (zero-energy buildings) and even buildings that produce 
surplus energy (energy-plus buildings).43 
These considerations have led several state and local governments to 
enact laws encouraging or requiring real estate developers and building 
owners to adopt more sustainable design and construction practices.44  
While many of the original sustainable construction (commonly called 
green building) initiatives relied primarily on incentives to promote 
voluntary compliance with sustainable construction standards in the 
private sector, a growing number of cities are moving toward requiring 
private projects to meet minimum green building standards.45  A recent 
Boston ordinance applies to all new buildings in excess of 50,000 square 
feet of floor area, as well as to rehabilitation projects of over 100,000 
square feet.46  The District of Columbia also imposes green building 
standards on many private projects,47 and other major cities have 
mandatory standards under consideration.48  There are at least some early 
                                                     
 41. PEKKA HUOVILA ET AL., U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, BUILDINGS AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE: STATUS, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 1 (2007). 
 42. See KIBERT, supra note 5, at 7–14. 
 43. HUOVILA, supra note 41, at 26–27. 
 44. For an overview of recent green building regulations see Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and 
Incentives to Promote Sustainable Construction and Green Building Projects in the Private Sector: 
A Call for More State Land Use Policy Initiatives, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 731, 751–62 (2008). 
 45. See Jess W. Abair, Green Buildings: What It Means To Be “Green” and the Evolution of 
Green Building Laws, 40 URB. LAW. 623, 628–32 (2008) (discussing local laws that set minimum 
standards for green buildings). 
 46. BOSTON, MASS., MUN. CODE § 37-3 (2007) (referencing BOSTON, MASS., MUN. CODE § 
80B (1996)). 
 47. D.C., CODE §§ 6-1451.01–11 (2008). 
 48. See Abair, supra note 45, at 630–32 (noting proposed local laws in Los Angeles and San 
Francisco); Circo, supra note 44, at 759–62 (referencing similar discussions in Santa Monica and 
Chicago). 
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signs of skepticism in the real estate development community that may 
fuel significant resistance when green building initiatives threaten profit 
margins.49 
b. Growth Management—The Oregon Experience 
Using an approach that is less direct than a sustainable construction 
building code, Oregon’s growth management strategy incorporates a 
sustainable development motif into the state’s smart growth controls.  
The smart growth, or anti-sprawl, approach to land use controls, while 
distinct from the global sustainability movement, evidences a closely 
related regional version of sustainability.50  As Professor Salkin has 
observed, smart growth concepts occur at the “dynamic intersection of 
land development and conservation.”51 
Oregon has been a leader in promulgating smart growth techniques.52  
An especially important feature of Oregon’s system is the adoption of 
urban growth boundaries, which establish geographic limits to prevent 
development from prematurely encroaching into agricultural areas.53  
Although the boundaries provide areas for urban growth, they impose 
state-wide growth management policies on local land use authorities for 
the purpose of carefully controlling urban sprawl.54  “In order for the 
boundary to be expanded or modified, a local government must 
demonstrate a need for additional urban areas that cannot be met by land 
already within the boundary.”55 
                                                     
 49. See, e.g., Cathy Lang Ho, Eco-Fraud: “Green Buildings” Might Not Be All They’re Made 
Out to Be, ARCHITECTURE, July 2003, at 31 (stating that “‘if green features don’t make good 
economic sense, the design is a failure’”) (quoting Greg Kiss, Brooklyn, New York-based architect); 
Jennifer Popovec, The Tipping Point, NAT’L REAL EST. INVESTOR, Nov. 2006, at 25 (“68% [of 
construction and real estate industry executives] said they avoided green construction because of 
concerns about cost.  They also said lack of awareness and sketchy information on the financial 
benefits held them back.”); Toccoa Switzer, Altruistic or Opportunistic?: Savvy Developers of Green 
Buildings Reduce Energy Costs, NAT’L REAL EST. INVESTOR, July 2006, at 105–06 (“the belief that 
green buildings cost more to build remains a major obstacle to the green building movement”). 
 50. Proponents of smart growth “value long-range, regional considerations of sustainability 
over short term incremental geographically isolated actions.”  AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, 
POLICY GUIDE ON SMART GROWTH § 1 (2002), available at http://www.planning.org/ 
policy/guides/adopted/smartgrowth.htm. 
 51. Patricia E. Salkin, Squaring the Circle on Sprawl: What More Can we Do?  Progress 
Toward Sustainable Land Use in the States, 16 WIDENER L.J. 787, 790 (2007). 
 52. Id. at 813. 
 53. Id. at 813–14. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 814. 
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Because urban growth boundaries sometimes thwart plans to realize 
the economic potential of land just beyond population centers, Oregon 
landowners and developers have frequently challenged the burdens that 
this regulatory scheme imposes on property rights.56  In 2004, an Oregon 
ballot initiative, Measure 37,57 temporarily set the state’s smart growth 
philosophy on its head by enacting a requirement that when a landowner 
establishes that a land use control reduces the fair market value of 
property, the government must either rescind the regulation promptly or 
pay the landowner compensation equal to the reduction in market 
value.58  Although in 2007, Oregon voters significantly limited the scope 
of the 2004 initiative,59 the story of Measure 37 may suggest that 
aggressive sustainable development initiatives will inevitably face strong 
opposition from property rights advocates.60 
c. Local Tree Preservation Programs 
Municipal tree preservation regulations provide another simple 
example of applied sustainability in potential conflict with private 
property rights.  A growing number of communities have incorporated 
tree preservation objectives into their land use planning.61  These 
regulations seek to balance the needs of current development, which 
frequently encourage the developer to clear naturally forested land, with 
a community’s desire to maintain a target level of forestry resources for 
the enjoyment of current citizens and future generations.62  Because trees 
are reproducible natural resources, the benefits that they provide to a 
community will continue indefinitely from one generation to the next 
unless threatened by some external force, such as real estate 
development.63  Contemporary tree preservation ordinances often require 
                                                     
 56. Id.  See Haviland v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 609 P.2d 423, 425–27 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1980) (providing an example of just such a challenge). 
 57. See generally Or. Ballot Measure 37 (2004), superseded by Or. Ballot Measure 49 (2007) 
(codified in scattered sections of Or. Rev. Stat.), available at http://www.oregonvotes.org 
/nov62007/guide/m49_text.html. 
 58. Michael C. Blumm & Erik Grafe, Enacting Libertarian Property: Oregon’s Measure 37 
and Its Implications, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 279, 281 n.1 (2007). 
 59. See generally Ballot Measure 49, supra note 57. 
 60. For a discussion of how this conflict played out in Oregon, see generally David J. 
Boulanger, Comment, The Battle Over Property Rights in Oregon: Measures 37 and 49 and the 
Need for Sustainable Land Use Planning, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 313 (2008). 
 61. See generally Christopher J. Duerksen, Tree and Vegetation Protection, in RATHKOPF’S 
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §§ 20:1–82 (2007) (comprehensively discussing tree 
preservation ordinances). 
 62. Id. § 20:1. 
 63. See generally id. §§ 20:3–7 (stating that trees serve a valid “public purpose” by contributing 
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developers to retain a specified proportion of existing trees64 or to replace 
trees that developers remove to make way for buildings and 
infrastructure.65  Once again, landowner and developer lawsuits confirm 
that regulations of this kind threaten U.S. concepts of private property.66 
2. Applying Sustainability Theory to the U.S. Timber Industry 
Sustainable development is not limited to real estate projects.  Much 
of the sustainability agenda seeks to alter industrial and commercial 
practices that exploit the world’s natural capital.  The timber industry 
provides one of the clearest examples.  Commercial logging companies 
sometimes use business strategies, such as clear cutting, that are 
unsustainable in two distinct senses.  First, while forests are renewable 
natural resources, logging activities must be deliberately managed if 
forests are to provide for the needs of each generation without interfering 
with the ability of future generations to satisfy their own needs.  Second, 
the earth’s continuing ability to absorb CO2 emissions depends on the 
sustainability of forests throughout the world.  Indeed, forests provide an 
especially interesting target for sustainability practices because they 
provide high-value resources for economic development purposes, 
contribute significantly to the earth’s carrying capacity, support 
biodiversity, offer treasured public recreation, and have inherent 
aesthetic value. 
Although the most highly publicized proposals call for international 
action to protect the earth’s forests, especially in tropical areas outside of 
the United States, sustainable development theory also suggests an 
argument for more sustainable management practices wherever strategic 
forests exist, including within the United States.  Even though Congress 
has acted repeatedly over the past century to protect and preserve 
                                                                                                                       
to the “beauty and attractiveness of our communities,” providing a “protective physical and 
psychological barrier between pedestrians and traffic,” and reducing the “impact of wind” among 
other benefits). 
 64. Id. § 20:58. 
 65. Id. § 20:60. 
 66. Ruthmarie Shea, Whose Tree Is It Anyway? A Case of First Impression, 77 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REV. 579, 583 (2000); see Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 513, 518 (Ariz. 1986) 
(declaring zoning ordinance unconstitutional); Allingham v. City of Seattle, 749 P.2d 160, 163–64 
(Wash. 1988) (en banc) (holding regulation was an unconstitutional taking), amended by 757 P.2d 
533 (Wash. 1988), overruled in part by Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907 (Wash. 
1990).  But see Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So.2d 1030, 1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (land 
use regulations do not amount to an unconstitutional taking); Pecora v. Gossin, 356 N.Y.S.2d 505 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (holding denial of excavation permit on land reserved for residential use to be 
“not confiscatory”), aff’d 370 N.Y.S.2d 281 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975). 
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national forests, “the majority of forestry is not required to be sustainable 
because most forests in this country are privately owned and therefore 
outside the scope of federal multiple-use sustained-yield requirements.”67  
Applying global sustainability principles in light of prevailing forestry 
practices in Virginia, one article proposed state legislation requiring the 
timber industry and private landowners in that state to adopt more 
sustainable forestry management practices.68  What justifies such 
apparently intrusive restrictions on the rights of private property?  “The 
state has a substantial interest in ensuring an adequate supply of timber 
for the future, in addition to equally important environmental protection 
justifications, including the reduction of greenhouse gases.”69 
III. PROPERTY THEORIES 
A rich and evolving body of scholarly work documents the history 
and development of property theory in the U.S. legal system.70  Because 
the theoretical scholarship on property spans centuries,71 it is not 
practical to examine in detail how sustainability may conflict with every 
competing theory of property.  For that reason, this part presents sketches 
of several leading themes, derived from three broad categories of 
theoretical work, selected because they prove especially useful for 
exploring the potential tension between sustainability and contemporary 
notions of private property rights in the United States.  Recognizing that 
the sustainability movement is a natural outgrowth of environmentalism, 
this part pays particular attention to property law concepts frequently 
invoked to achieve or assess environmental objectives, such as redressing 
pollution and protecting natural resources. 
In recognition that economic analysis holds a central place in 
contemporary property theory in this country,72 the discussion that 
follows divides the contrasting concepts along a rough chronology 
related to the emergence of economic analysis as the leading theory 
                                                     
 67. Robert Jackson Allen, Sustainable Forestry in Virginia: Opportunities for Overdue 
Legislation and Options for Private Landowners, 7 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 4 (2007). 
 68. Id. at 30–31. 
 69. Id. at 31. 
 70. See generally PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW (Robert C. Ellickson, Carol M. Rose, & 
Bruce A. Ackerman eds., 2d ed. 2002); A PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY (Richard H. Chused ed., 1993). 
 71. See generally Stuart Banner, Transitions between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 
359 (2002); Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601 
(1998); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View from Century’s 
End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
 72. See Rose, supra note 71, at 618–19 (discussing the role of economic analysis in property 
law). 
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among U.S. property scholars.  Accordingly, it first takes up themes 
derived from traditional theories that were well formed in the legal 
literature before economic analysis achieved its current status.  Next it 
surveys themes from the mainstream law and economics literature that 
are especially important to consider in light of the sustainability 
movement.  Finally, on a highly selective basis, it reviews a few 
alternative themes in property theory that came to the fore only after the 
emergence of contemporary economic analysis.  This third, and final, 
sketch highlights ethical perspectives that are especially pertinent to the 
most ambitious sustainability theories.  While reducing centuries of 
property theory to just three general categories requires simplification, 
the technique is not novel,73 and it allows sufficient conceptualization for 
the purpose at hand. 
A. Selected Themes from Traditional Theories of Property 
Conventionally, U.S. law has treated property as a fundamental 
individual right to be protected by government.74  As the brief review 
that follows shows, several related political philosophies contributed to 
this individual rights approach.  What unites the traditional theories is an 
ethical perspective that attributes intrinsic value to individual dominion 
over private property.  That value may stem from traditions of Western 
religions,75 the related tenets of natural law in Western philosophy,76 or 
more simply from the utilitarian intuition that private property is 
essential for human happiness in a democratic society.77  In truth, all of 
these notions work together to support the conventional view.  
Traditional theories produce a strong commitment for government to 
recognize and protect an individual’s right to acquire property, especially 
                                                     
 73. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1323–24 (1993) 
(contrasting the regimes of open-access property, group property, and individual property); Rose, 
supra note 71, at 602–03 (grouping property theories into three contrasting strategies— the 
doctrinalist, the utilitarian, and the critical); Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and 
Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 
313–14 (2006) (categorizing property thinking into an exclusive dominion model, which he calls the 
castle model, the investment model, and the citizenship model). 
 74. See O. Lee Reed, What is “Property”?, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 473–83 (2004) (discussing 
property as an individual right); Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 329, 332–33 (1996) (arguing that property is the most important right). 
 75. John Locke, for example, consistently relied on the Bible in support of his theory of 
property.  See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 25, 31, 
38 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690). 
 76. See infra notes 81–96 and accompanying text. 
 77. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 74, at 348–56 (discussing what Rose labels the “symbolic” and 
“civilizing” arguments that property is the most important of all rights). 
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land, and to maintain a relatively high degree of control over the use and 
enjoyment of private property.  Admittedly, public policy considerations 
that have always been evident in the common law tradition, especially in 
its evolving and expanding view of the police power, significantly 
temper the traditional ideal of individual property rights.78  But ongoing 
debates about the proper limits on governmental power to interfere with 
private property rights show that the individual rights emphasis of 
traditional theories continues to have much force.79 
Because U.S. law derives from the common law of England, 
Blackstone’s perspective on the institution of property offers both a 
logical and a customary starting point for exploring the traditional 
theories of property in this country.  Blackstone’s famous reference to an 
owner’s absolute dominion generally comports with the centrality of 
individual rights in property as a common law tenet.80  Although 
Blackstone’s account was more concerned with the content of property 
law than with its theoretical basis, it reflects aspects of several antecedent 
property theories.  His ruminations on the justifications for private 
property incorporate the first occupancy theory, which is one of the 
oldest and most pragmatic explanations of the institution of private 
property,81 and they also include a natural law analysis based on Locke’s 
labor theory and a rudimentary utilitarianism.82  Taken together, these 
                                                     
 78. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–89 (1926) (the seminal case 
establishing the constitutionality of land use zoning); Claridge v. N.H. Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287, 
290–91 (N.H. 1984) (upholding the denial of a landowner’s request for a fill permit necessary for 
development of the property); Daddario v. Cape Cod Comm’n, 780 N.E.2d 124, 130–31 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2002) (upholding environmental regulations); see also Steve Sheppard, The State Interest in the 
Good Citizen: Constitutional Balance Between the Citizen and the Perfectionist State, 45 HASTINGS 
L.J. 969, 994–97 (1994) (discussing the police power). 
 79. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 80. Blackstone described the right of property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one 
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any 
other individual in the universe.”  2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND (Edward Christian ed., 1807) (1766). 
 81. See Lawrence Berger, An Analysis of the Doctrine That “First in Time is First in Right”, 64 
NEB. L. REV. 349, 350–53 (1985) (discussing the first occupancy theory); Richard A. Epstein, 
Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1238–43 (1979) (same).  Although the 
occupancy theory arguably has as much historical significance as Locke’s labor theory in explaining 
the common law’s notion of private property, this Article views occupancy theory as an incomplete 
prelude to Locke’s more elegant version of the social compact story.  To the extent, however, that 
occupancy retains independent standing in property theory, it merely underscores the importance of 
the exclusive dominion theme of traditional property theories.  A property regime founded primarily 
on rights established through possession or occupancy would be even less receptive to societal limits 
on individual property rights than the other traditional property conceptions described in this Article 
because occupancy theory does not presume that all property was owned in common in the original 
state.  See id. at 1229–30.  Accordingly, occupancy theory may conflict with sustainability in a more 
fundamental way than the blended version of traditional property theories portrayed in this Article. 
 82. See Rose, supra note 71, at 603–07 (tracing all of these elements in Blackstone). 
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principles led Blackstone to highlight the exclusive dominion attribute 
that accounts for the strong common law commitment to private property 
as an individual right. 
As Carol Rose has convincingly shown, however, neither Blackstone 
nor the common law of his time literally subscribed to the notion of 
property as one person’s “sole and despotic dominion”83 over an asset.84  
In fact, private property of Blackstone’s time existed only within a 
context of the superior rights of the sovereign and the correlative rights 
of neighboring property owners.  The first of these, the right of the 
sovereign to promote and protect public order and welfare, transformed 
into the inherent police power of democratic government in the United 
States.85  The second, the law of private and public nuisance,86 continues 
today as the common law’s primary and ever-evolving restraint on 
private property rights.  Thus, at least as concerns the historical basis for 
U.S. law, the notion of absolute dominion over property as a matter of 
individual right, wholly unaffected by the rights of society and 
government, is a myth, or at least an acknowledged idealization useful 
primarily to contrast theory with reality.87  What we can safely conclude 
from reading Blackstone is this: when the members of the Constitutional 
Convention met, as well as when the people of the original states adopted 
their own constitutions, they were operating within a theoretical 
framework committed to a strong concept of private property 
ownership.88 
While Blackstone notoriously characterized the common law’s 
dedication to private property as an individual right, he did not offer a 
comprehensive theory of property sufficient for the United States’ 
                                                     
 83. BLACKSTONE, supra note 80. 
 84. See Rose, supra note 71, at 601–06. 
 85. Sheppard, supra note 78, at 997 (observing that “commentators in the early federal period 
described the concept of police powers in terms consonant with the English common-law tradition, 
essentially substituting the state as the sovereign”). 
 86. See Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic 
Property Cases About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 765–72 (1979) (describing the 
early common law roots of nuisance doctrine). 
 87. See Rose, supra note 71, at 603–04 (“it might be best to conclude that for Blackstone, the 
Exclusivity Axiom was in a sense a trope, a rhetorical figure describing an extreme or ideal type 
rather than reality”). 
 88. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISON FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 1–3 (1990); Stanley N. Katz, 
Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467, 467–70 
(1976).  Even if this devotion to private property was not universal during colonial times, it quickly 
prevailed after the American Revolution.  See Elizabeth V. Mensch, The Colonial Origins of Liberal 
Property Rights, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 635, 733–35 (1982). 
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constitutional process.89  That important component, which predated 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, came from seventeenth and eighteenth 
century political philosophy.90  John Locke’s political philosophy was 
especially influential at the moment of the country’s birth.91  Locke’s 
famous syllogism on property emanated from his conception of natural 
law and the metaphoric social compact that he used to justify private 
property.  Locke gave voice to the classic liberalism of Western political 
philosophy: 
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet 
every Man has a Property in his own Person.  This no Body has any 
Right to but himself.  The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his 
Hands, we may say, are properly his.  Whatsoever then he removes out 
of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his 
Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby 
makes it his Property.  It being by him removed from the common state 
Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that 
excludes the common right of other Men.92 
Locke’s explanation holds much appeal, if for no other reason than 
because it offers a moral defense for the human instinct to acquire and 
control assets that are necessary for survival or useful for comfort. 
Locke profoundly affected Jefferson’s concept of property, although 
Jefferson was less concerned with property theory than he was with the 
relationship between property holding and good citizenship in a 
republic.93  Jefferson thought that ownership and cultivation of land were 
essential marks of personal virtue, and he believed that the opportunity 
for widespread land ownership in America made republicanism 
possible.94  Jefferson, of course, modulated Locke’s “Lives, Liberties,  
 
                                                     
 89. See Rose, supra note 71, at 603–06 (explaining how lightly Blackstone dealt with the 
justification for strong private property rights). 
 90. In addition to John Locke’s theory of property, discussed in the text, the property notions of 
Bentham and Hegel are often cited as particularly important for understanding an American 
framework of property.  See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 531, 541–43 (2005). 
 91. See Katz, supra note 88, at 468–70. 
 92. LOCKE, supra note 75, § 27. 
 93. See Katz, supra note 88, at 478–84 (discussing Thomas Jefferson’s views on property). 
 94. Id. at 483. 
CIRCO FINAL 11/6/2009  1:33:21 PM 
108 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
and Estates”95 so that happiness replaced estates,96 but that in no way 
diluted the importance of private property in our national psyche. 
It is possible, however, to place too much importance on the role that 
Lockean theory or any other natural rights or social compact reasoning 
plays in contemporary U.S. notions of property, and it is error to interpret 
any of these traditional perspectives to require unrestrained private 
property rights.97  Furthermore, it is unproductive to pretend that any 
natural law or instinctive version of traditional property theory has much 
residual force in modern society.  Stripped entirely of its implicit 
utilitarianism, a traditional theory along Lockean lines lacks credibility.98  
For that reason, an assessment of sustainability theory in light of U.S. 
concepts of property rights can logically ignore as fanciful any 
justification for property that stems primarily from the labor theory or 
from some similarly artificial reliance on a social compact rationale.  
These pristine property theories simply leave too many pressing 
questions unanswered.  If, for example, the premise rests on each 
individual’s natural claim to the labor of his or her own body, how could 
the same political philosophy that revered property also have tolerated 
slavery?  What is the essential link between a person’s natural claim to 
his or her person and labor, and a right to appropriate the natural 
resources in which a person invests labor?  To what extent does adding 
labor to a natural resource justify the laborer’s exclusive dominion in the 
face of scarcity?  How much labor earns the laborer a perpetual claim 
over the resource or its product? 
At a minimum, these highly instinctive theories must concede, as 
both Locke’s account and the common law did, that an individual should 
not gain property by disregarding the natural rights of others.99  Indeed, 
Locke noted that his argument presumed both an abundance of natural 
resources and the equal opportunity of all persons to acquire property 
through labor,100 and he made at least a passing nod to the affects of 
                                                     
 95. LOCKE, supra note 75, § 123.  Locke reserved the word “property” to encompass all three 
components when he reasoned that a man in the state of nature would rationally join in society “for 
the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties, and Estates, which I call by the general Name, 
Property.”  Id. 
 96. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 97. See infra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
 98. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 90, at 603–04 (critiquing Lockean theory through 
modern references to eminent domain). 
 99. See Rose, supra note 71, at 603–04 (using Blackstone to assert common law beliefs 
regarding property). 
 100. Locke concluded his famous statement of the labor theory of property with this sentence: 
“For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right 
to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for 
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property ownership on the competing rights of others in society.101  
Although the laborer logically may earn a property claim by adding 
value to a natural resource, that does not justify even an idealized notion 
of absolute, perpetual ownership in the natural asset itself.102 
In fact, from its inception, the nation’s property regime was 
considerably more practical than Locke’s labor theory or any other 
intuitive philosophy of law.  While natural rights concepts and Locke’s 
labor theory continued to play important roles in justifying the social 
institution of property, they were not at the heart of the Federalists’ 
devotion to property rights.103  The Federalists’ idea of government, 
which ultimately prevailed over Jeffersonian republicanism, reflected a 
different, yet even stronger, commitment to property rights.104  In the 
Federalists’ hands, property theory had more pragmatic, utilitarian, and 
political flavors that emphasized the need for a democratic society to 
protect private property from the oppression of majority rule.105  The 
Federalists insisted that strong property rights were essential to liberty 
and security in a democracy.106  This version of the traditional 
perspective incorporated the rudimentary utilitarian strains that were 
already evident in Blackstone107 and that were expressed more fully by 
leading political philosophers of the day, especially Jeremy Bentham.108  
It also included some elements of “Hume’s claim that the law of property 
is, at root, a convention that has evolved spontaneously—that ‘arises 
gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated 
experience.’”109 
                                                                                                                       
others.”  LOCKE, supra note 75, § 27 (emphasis added). 
 101. Id. § 36.  Locke, however, was more concerned about the basis for property rights than the 
potential limits on the use of property.  See id. 
 102. Why, for example, many years after planting and cultivating a field and consuming the 
grain produced, should the laborer still have the right to exclude others from that field or to insist on 
heirs’ rights to continue cultivating it for as long as they may wish?  Does the woodworker earn the 
whole tree by carving a bowl from a branch?  To the contrary, do natural property rights diminish as 
the human race expands and resources become increasingly scarce? 
 103. NEDELSKY, supra note 88, at 28–30. 
 104. See generally id. at 67–95. 
 105. See id. at 3–9 (discussing property theory and the idea of limited government); Katz, supra 
note 88, at 484–87 (noting that protecting property rights was a principle function of the U.S. 
Constitution). 
 106. NEDELSKY, supra note 88, at 25–28.  This American idea linking individual liberty to 
private property has persisted through the years.  Ellickson, supra note 73, at 1352–54. 
 107. See Rose, supra note 71, at 606–08 (showing evidence of utilitarian ideals within 
Blackstone). 
 108. Id. at 618–19. 
 109. ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE 58 (2d ed. 
2004) (quoting DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 490 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1978) (1740)). 
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From this more practical perspective, mere observation confirms that 
humans are instinctively acquisitive.  The pragmatist concludes that 
government should establish those legal institutions, such as private 
property, that contribute significantly to human happiness.110  It does not 
matter so much whether this is important because God provided natural 
resources for human happiness,111 because instinct drives every 
individual to acquire property,112 or because human labor justifies the 
result.113 
On this basis, a version of classical utilitarianism, coexisting with 
natural law or intuition, emerged as the essential theoretical rationale for 
the U.S. political system’s commitment to private property as being 
ineluctably linked to human happiness and civil order.114  Thus, long 
before the modern law and economics movement matured, a utilitarian 
perspective informed property theory in the United States without 
completely superseding the more instinctive arguments.115  For purposes 
of this Article, therefore, traditional theories of property are based, in 
different degrees, on natural rights, occupancy theory, Locke’s labor 
theory, social compact reasoning, intuition, and classical utilitarianism.  
And, according to the inherited common law tradition, they are restrained 
by the antecedents of nuisance law and the power of government to 
protect the public order and welfare. 
A property theory with that pedigree embraces strong individual 
property rights, but it also suggests that the law as applied must be 
practical.  Individuals in society must accept limits on private property 
(and other individual rights) in exchange for the benefits that a well-
ordered political society offers.  Over time, U.S. law engrafted many 
qualifications on the right of property.  Some of these, such as those 
carrying on common law nuisance principles, were inevitable 
accommodations between competing property interests in a dynamic 
society that the courts worked out through the normal common law 
process.116  But others resulted only after considerable judicial anguish  
 
                                                     
 110. Madison in particular reflected this view.  See NEDELSKY, supra note 88, at 17. 
 111. As already noted, much of Locke’s theory reflected this view.  See LOCKE, supra note 75. 
 112. See Ellickson, supra note 73, at 1353 (discussing relevant theories advanced by social 
scientists). 
 113. The Federalists’ “ideas do not constitute political theory on the order of Locke . . . .”  
NEDELSKY, supra note 88, at 13. 
 114. See Rose, supra note 71, at 618–23. 
 115. See Katz, supra note 88, at 485–87 (discussing how such a balance was achieved). 
 116. See generally Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
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because they tested the sanctity of property under the U.S. 
Constitution.117 
The constitutional cases eventually spawned a process, reflective of 
the common law, by which courts balance property rights with other 
highly regarded civil rights and public policies.118  Because the balancing 
test approach breeds judicial discretion, scholars continue to debate both 
the legitimacy of the tests themselves and the application of those tests to 
particular cases.119  Reflecting a similar rationale, and also with a good 
deal of controversy, legislatures over the past several decades have 
modulated this common law theme by enacting land use and pollution 
control laws to strike a balance between private property rights and 
police power objectives.120  What is most important for our purposes is 
that, as presently understood, traditional property theories establish 
relatively few objective rules fixing the limits of governmental 
restrictions on property rights.  As a result, appellate courts applying the 
traditional theories already have discretion to resolve conflicts between 
private property rights and the sustainability agenda by balancing the 
competing interests. 
In this sense, traditional property theories may be reconciled readily 
with a conservationist theory of sustainability.  The consistency arises 
because courts and legislatures in the United States, consistent with the 
common law tradition, necessarily have broad authority to impose limits 
on private property rights for the benefit of the constitutional society.  On 
this basis, courts almost effortlessly developed the common law of 
riparian rights121 and contemporary applications of the common law 
rubrics of public and private nuisance.122  The underlying theme here is 
that, while private property rights are fundamental, for a democratic  
 
                                                     
 117. See NEDELSKY, supra note 88, at 225–29 (discussing how the U.S. Supreme Court has 
treated property rights over the last century); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 47–62 (1977) (discussing mill statutes which infringed on private 
property to promote economic development). 
 118. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 119. See Circo, supra note 44, at 762–65 (discussing the debate between mandates and 
incentives in real estate development). 
 120. Id. at 745–46. 
 121. See, e.g., Lynda L. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian Jurisdiction: 
Defining the Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 95, 105–07, 
125–30 (1985) (discussing the reasonable use requirement); J. W. Looney, An Update on Arkansas 
Water Law: Is the Riparian Rights Doctrine Dead?, 43 ARK. L. REV. 573, 574–76 (1990) (“[E]ach 
riparian owner is entitled to make reasonable use . . . of the water from a stream, but the right is 
extended only to that land which is considered to be riparian.”). 
 122. See, e.g., J. H. Beuscher & Jerry W. Morrison, Judicial Zoning through Recent Nuisance 
Cases, 1955 WIS. L. REV. 440, 440–42 (discussing trends in recent nuisance cases). 
CIRCO FINAL 11/6/2009  1:33:21 PM 
112 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
society to thrive, the legal system must also recognize relatively 
significant limitations on private property. 
We can also easily see the potential for conflict between traditional 
property theories and the generational and social justice theories of 
sustainability.  Traditional property theorists do not inherently consider 
generational justice or social justice, although they may recognize that 
the justifications for private property rights depend on an abundance of 
natural resources within a specific society.123  In effect, because 
traditional property theories are temporally and geographically myopic, 
they simply may not perceive that subsequent generations, persons with 
marginal social status, or remote citizens of the earth have any competing 
claims that should limit the rights of property owners within a specific 
society or community.124 
As already noted, as early as Blackstone, the traditional theories 
included at least an implicit utilitarian strain.  As the study of economics 
grew into a highly developed field of social science steeped in utilitarian 
logic, the link between the traditional theories and utilitarianism evolved 
into a coherent economic analysis of property as a social institution.  As 
the next part explains, economics provided the science necessary to 
argue that private property is inherently utilitarian. 
B. Selected Themes from Economic Theories of Property 
Economics studies human behavior in the face of scarce resources.125  
In that light, an economic perspective claims to match the real world 
better than the more intuitive approaches of seventeenth and eighteenth 
century political philosophy.  Several key assumptions about human 
behavior characterize neoclassical economic theory.126  First, an 
economic analysis of law assumes that people are rational decision-
makers and that they can predict and evaluate the probable consequences 
                                                     
 123. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
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of available choices.127  In keeping with these fundamental principles of 
human behavior, an economic analysis further assumes that people will 
make logical choices to maximize self-interest—as defined by each 
person.128  Another key assumption is that governments should generally 
establish legal rules and institutions that efficiently maximize benefits to 
society as a whole.129  In the public realm, this means that the law should 
serve what economists generally call social welfare.130  Although these 
assumptions are important for purposes of the basic theoretical model, 
economists also recognize that these assumptions are imperfect and that 
they apply with a considerable degree of variation.131  Moreover, 
economists from different schools of thought have developed a variety of 
tools and approaches to conform economic analysis more closely to 
reality.132 
These fundamental principles disclose that the economic perspective 
is essentially utilitarian.133  Given that traditional property theories also 
have strong utilitarian inclinations,134 what fundamentally distinguishes 
those theories from the contemporary economic perspective on property?  
The answer relates to the role that these contrasting theories assign to 
utilitarian objectives.  While the traditional theories frequently 
incorporate utilitarian notions and apply them in an intuitive way, 
economics has a utilitarian soul that finds expression through scientific 
tools, objective analysis, and mathematical calculations.  From the 
economic perspective, an individual’s overriding goal, and therefore the 
motivation driving everyone’s behavior, is to maximize his or her own 
interests, taking into account the person’s subjective value system.135  
Similarly, many economists argue that a society’s overriding goal should 
be to realize the maximum utility for its citizens.136  For a legal system, a 
central proposition therefore emerges from these principles of economic 
analysis: Economically sound legal rules and institutions maximize 
social welfare at the least cost.  An economic analysis, then, is a rigorous 
                                                     
 127. See id. at 13–14 (explaining the concept of perfectly competitive markets); STEVEN 
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cost-benefit analysis.  And an economically sound society and its 
institutions strive to maximize net social wealth within the context of a 
world constrained by limited resources and inhabited by rational interest 
maximizers. 
How sustainability theory fares under an economic analysis of 
property, therefore, derives from the principle that a legal system should 
establish property rules that will operate efficiently to maximize social 
welfare.  The concept of efficiency in economics is sophisticated and 
complex, and economists strive to quantify the analytical process.  As a 
result, determining the extent to which an economic approach to the 
institution of property will accommodate the objectives of the 
sustainability movement requires a careful and thorough cost-benefit 
analysis. 
Richard Posner explains an economic analysis of the legal institution 
of property in this way: “legal protection of property rights creates 
incentives to exploit resources efficiently.”137  The economist’s essential 
purpose is not to explain why this is true; it is sufficient to demonstrate 
by observation, experiment, and calculation that it is so.  According to 
Posner, a property regime should leverage the overriding advantage of 
exclusive, individual ownership: 
The proper incentives are created by parceling out mutually exclusive 
rights to the use of particular resources among the members of society.  
If every piece of land is owned by someone—if there is always 
someone who can exclude all others from access to any given area—
then individuals will endeavor by cultivation or other improvements to 
maximize the value of land.  Land is just an example.  The principle 
applies to all valuable resources.138 
A simple situation involving two distinct property interests in a 
single parcel of land nicely illustrates Posner’s economic analysis of 
property.  Consider a landowner and a sharecropping tenant.  The 
landowner provides the land and the tangible agricultural inputs, and the 
tenant contributes the labor.  In Posner’s example, the landowner and the 
tenant agree to divide the proceeds from the crops equally.  He provides 
this economic analysis to show that the arrangement is not optimal: 
Suppose that if the farmer worked an extra hour every week on 
improving the land he would increase the dollar value of the farm’s 
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output by $2 (net of any additional costs besides his time), and that the 
opportunity cost . . . of his time in forgone leisure is only $1.50.  
Efficiency requires that he work the extra hour, but he will not, because 
under his deal with the landlord he will receive only $1 for work that 
costs him $1.50.139 
While the two parties could modify their sharecropping arrangement to 
create the appropriate incentive for the tenant to work the extra hour, that 
may involve costs to negotiate, monitor, and enforce the more complex 
agreement.  Moreover, a truly efficient sharecropping agreement must 
address other problems that arise from divided ownership, such as 
providing incentives for one party or the other to invest in capital 
improvements that will optimize production.  At least as far as Posner 
goes in exploring this illustration, it seems that an arrangement that puts 
one of the parties in sole title will inherently be more efficient than 
divided ownership.140 
Note some important features of Posner’s analysis of the 
sharecropping problem.  His concern with how the arrangement divides 
the $2 additional benefit between the landowner and the tenant is not 
whether the deal is fair, but whether it assures that the land produces the 
optimum value—the maximum net social welfare.  From society’s 
perspective, an economically sound arrangement should encourage the 
tenant to work the additional hour each week simply because that extra 
hour of work will exact $2 of additional value in the aggregate in 
exchange for a total cost of only $1.50. 
In this respect, the economic perspective departs starkly from the 
traditional theories of property described in Part III.A, which tend to 
conceptualize property as a matter of individual rights.  The economic 
analysis does not ask whether the arrangement contributes to the liberty 
or autonomy of either party; it simply posits that each party can reliably 
quantify the utility (benefits) and disutility (costs) involved and will act 
accordingly.  The added crop value is the gross benefit to the social 
welfare.  Because the total benefit involved ($2) exceeds the total cost 
($1.50), from a social welfare perspective the economically efficient 
outcome is clear: the tenant should work the extra hour, although the 
ownership structure dictates otherwise.  The additional production would 
confer a known monetary benefit on the landlord at no additional cost, 
which means that the landlord favors the extra work, but, unless the 
landlord proactively decides to propose an adjustment to the sharing 
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formula, the landlord will play no role in the decision.  The additional 
production would also confer a similar monetary benefit on the tenant, 
who can also quantify the cost of the additional labor involved.  On that 
basis, the tenant will choose the course that is less efficient for society 
because that course is more efficient for the tenant.  In this case, the 
socially efficient result is to modify the sharecropping arrangement in 
some way that induces the tenant, as an economically rational actor, to 
work an extra hour per week. 
Sustainability problems, of course, are considerably more complex 
than this stylized sharecropper situation, which only considers the 
interests and behavior of two stakeholders in relationship to an isolated 
decision.  Sustainability involves the broadest and most long-term social 
effects of a property system on the behavior of many persons over space 
and time.  The economic analysis, therefore, must expand. 
The work of A. C. Pigou provides a logical place to begin exploring 
an economic analysis of property within a broader social welfare 
context.141  It was he who made the concept of externalities a staple term 
in the economist’s lexicon.142  An externality is an effect (either a burden 
or a benefit) of an activity that affects the behavior of a party other than 
the actor.143  A burden or cost created by the action or decision of one 
person or enterprise that is borne by others is a negative externality.  
Economic theory traditionally holds that an actor will not take into 
account the external effects of a contemplated action.  In general, Pigou 
believed that externalities indicated market failures, and he argued that a 
main function of government should be to introduce and manage 
adjustments to cause externalities to be internalized into the relevant 
decision-making process.  Pigou especially advocated the use of taxes to 
offset negative externalities.144  His analysis, however, may also be used 
to justify government subsidies and regulations calculated to influence 
economic decisions in circumstances in which natural market forces are 
inadequate to assure that the externalities of an economic decision 
properly figure into the cost-benefit analysis.145 
Harold Demsetz’s seminal development of an economic perspective 
on property rights and society applies Pigou’s approach to externalities in 
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a way that is accessible even to those with limited knowledge of 
economics.146  Demsetz confirms the essentially utilitarian character of 
the economic analysis of property in this way: “Property rights are an 
instrument of society and derive their significance from the fact that they 
help a man form those expectations which he can reasonably hold in his 
dealings with others.”147  The right of property includes “the right to 
benefit or harm oneself or others,”148 an observation that “leads easily to 
the close relationship between property rights and externalities.”149  In 
other words, to whatever extent a property system confers on an owner 
the freedom to choose how to use the property, an owner acting out of 
self-interest may choose to use the property in a way that imposes costs 
(harm) on others.  Recall Posner’s claim that an economically sound 
property system involves “parceling out mutually exclusive rights to the 
use of particular resources among the members of society.”150  To the 
extent that is true, an economically sound property system (one that 
promotes maximum social utility) must consider the costs to others that 
result from a property owner’s decisions about how to use the property. 
In a passage that seems to recognize the potential ecological limits of 
economics, Demsetz acknowledges that no effects of human conduct are 
“external to the world. . . .  What converts a harmful or beneficial effect 
into an externality is that the cost of bringing the effect to bear on the 
decisions of one or more of the interacting persons is too high to make it 
worthwhile”151 for the property system to take into account.  That is, as a 
matter of efficiency, the property system does not cause the person 
whose conduct produces the particular harmful or beneficial effect to feel 
the impact personally, and therefore the person logically does not include 
that effect in a cost-benefit analysis.  When, by contrast, the property 
regime judges it economical to take beneficial or harmful effects into 
account, it internalizes those effects by “a process, usually a change in 
property rights, that enables these effects to bear (in greater degree) on 
all interacting persons.”152  Viewed from this perspective, “[a] primary 
function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a 
greater internalization of externalities.”153 
                                                     
 146. See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
347 (1967) (discussing the close relationship between property rights and externalities). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. POSNER, supra note 137, at 32. 
 151. Demsetz, supra note 146, at 348. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
CIRCO FINAL 11/6/2009  1:33:21 PM 
118 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
Recognizing the problem of externalities underscores an important 
challenge for a private property rights system, and sustainability 
considerations amplify that challenge.  While economic analysis favors 
private property rights for the efficiency advantages Posner notes, a 
property regime also must be open to adjusting private property rights to 
compensate for externalities.  Rather than insist on a doctrinaire 
commitment to private property rights, Demsetz emphasized that any 
system of property must behave according to economic principles, which 
in turn control the evolution of private property rights in society.  He 
explained that a proper interpretation of his thesis “requires that account 
be taken of a community’s preferences for private ownership.  Some 
communities will have less well-developed private ownership systems 
and more highly developed state ownership systems.”154  Whatever the 
property regime, however, he argued that basic economic considerations 
dictate that “the emergence of new private or state-owned property rights 
will be in response to changes in technology and relative prices.”155 
Thus, an economic theory of property does not inevitably assert the 
absolute efficiency or superiority of private property.156  In fact, in a 
much later piece, Demsetz concluded that “communal rights are the more 
efficient social arrangement under some circumstances.”157  Similarly, 
Robert Ellickson has shown that some forms of group ownership of land 
can be more efficient than individual ownership, especially within a 
close-knit group, for certain limited purposes, such as establishing the 
most efficient land boundaries for a particular land use158 or to spread 
risks efficiently in certain situations involving high-cost risks.159  But 
Ellickson’s endorsement of communitarian property systems is highly 
qualified and limited to narrow circumstances.  There is little in 
Ellickson’s modest concessions to group ownership to contradict 
Demsetz’s conclusion that “we know as a matter of fact that reliance on 
private ownership has increased on a trend basis over long stretches of 
time.”160  At least when the calculus primarily reflects the costs and  
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benefits to those most immediately affected by an event, the efficiency 
thesis of economic analysis strongly favors private property. 
How should an economically sound property system develop rules to 
address externalities?  This is a critical question in the context of 
sustainability.  Although Demsetz seemed to suggest that in the ideal 
economic system a property owner would bear all costs attributable to 
the owner’s use of the property,161 that is not necessarily the case, 
especially when economic analysis focuses rigorously on net social 
welfare.  In The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase established his 
highly influential economic framework for analyzing externalities.162  In 
particular, Coase examined commercial activity that involves harm to 
those other than the owner of the property that generates the activity.  He 
expressly considered two simple examples, among others: a factory that 
pollutes neighboring land,163 and a ranching operation from which 
straying cattle damage a neighboring farmer’s crops.164  The resulting 
harm in each situation is a social cost.  Coase challenged the prevailing 
economic analysis of the day, which he said would seek a device, such as 
damage liability or a tax, that would cause the factory or the rancher to 
internalize the harmful effects the activity imposes on others.165  Instead, 
he viewed the situation as involving reciprocal costs.  If the factory, for 
example, is to have the right to operate for maximum productivity, the 
neighbors suffer harm in the form of the pollution, but if the neighbors 
are to have the right to enjoy their property free of the pollution, the 
factory suffers because it cannot operate at its optimum capacity.166  The 
issue, Coase argued, should not be which interest to protect but how best 
“to avoid the more serious harm.”167  This approach, therefore, requires 
the cost-benefit calculus to take into account the costs to the plant in lost 
production as well as the pollution costs to the neighbors. 
Applying the analysis to the rancher’s straying cattle, Coase 
demonstrated that if the standard assumptions of neoclassical economics 
apply, then no matter whether the legal rules require the rancher to pay 
for the harm the unruly cattle cause to the farmer’s crops, or the farmer 
to pay the rancher to eliminate or reduce the crop damage, the rancher 
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will operate at the same optimal level.168  That is, so long as the parties 
have the practical ability to negotiate efficiently on their own—in 
economic terms, so long as there are no transaction costs and the parties 
have complete information—the parties will negotiate an agreement, such 
as payment by one party to the other, that redistributes the aggregate 
costs.  The distribution will be to whatever extent, if any, necessary to 
permit the rancher to operate at a level at which the value the herd 
produces for the rancher exceeds all costs involved, including the costs 
that straying cattle impose on the farmer and any costs of mitigating the 
damage, such as fencing.  While the legal rules will affect the relative 
wealth of the rancher in comparison to the wealth of the farmer by 
determining who will bear certain costs, it will not dissuade the rancher 
from building up the herd to the point that the total costs of operation, 
including all the costs of crop damage (whoever bears those costs), still 
allow incremental operations (increased herd size) to create excess net 
value.169  Under this analysis, economics seeks the optimal use of the 
land resources involved, which is a matter of aggregate social welfare, 
and it does not necessarily concern itself with equity between the 
neighboring landowners.  The latter matter involves only the relative 
distribution of wealth between the competing interests rather than the 
efficient use of resources for the maximization of wealth in society. 
But, of course, as Coase himself recognized, negotiating an 
economic solution to a property dispute invariably involves transaction 
costs, and most real life situations also involve other potential market 
failures, all of which may skew or even squelch negotiations.170  Under 
these circumstances, economic analysis supports a legal rule that “avoids 
the greater harm,” such as a rule that imposes “the burden (or duty) of 
cost avoidance or abatement on the party that can do so at the lowest 
cost.”171  In practical terms, however, this may be a difficult goal to 
achieve, especially if the objective is to devise a legal rule that allocates 
the competing property rights in a way that avoids the dispute in the first 
place.  For present purposes, however, the important point is that in a 
world in which there are always transaction costs and in which other 
economic assumptions apply imperfectly, an economic analysis should 
take into account all of the costs and should propose a rule that offers the 
best chance to achieve the maximum net social welfare. 
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Notice the important difference between the economic approach as 
evidenced by Coase’s straying cattle problem and a more traditional 
property law analysis.  Traditional property theory might in fact become 
mired in the normative question whether to prefer the property rights of 
the rancher or the neighboring farmer.  The usual solution would require 
either a preference rule (such as a first in time preference, or assigning a 
higher intrinsic value to one use or the other) or some kind of balancing 
of the competing rights that would seek to establish fair or reasonable 
correlative rights for the two property owners.172  This is, for example, 
roughly the approach we may find in nuisance law.173  But the ideal 
economic solution, once we recognize that there are reasons why the 
parties will probably not negotiate to the most efficient result on their 
own, would be to establish a pre-existing liability rule that has the 
greatest potential for maximizing the net social welfare.  And, at least for 
many economists, there is no reason to be concerned about which of the 
two property owners must bear those costs that cannot be efficiently 
avoided.174 
The discussion to this point reveals the centrality of net efficiency in 
economic analysis, which in turn exposes the normative aspects of the 
economic perspective.  Those aspects involve at least two distinct value 
judgments.  First, economic theory asserts that efficiency is a primary, 
and perhaps the controlling, purpose of a property system.  This 
proposition implies a value judgment in the sense that not everyone 
recognizes the inherent virtue of efficiency,175 and even those who do 
need not concede that efficiency is the singular or the highest purpose of 
a property system.176  The economic preference for efficiency is rooted in 
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utilitarian values.  The efficient use of assets is the use that produces 
consequences with the greatest net social utility.177  Note, however, that 
economic analysis does not determine which consequences have positive 
utility (benefits) and which involve disutility (costs), and that it 
recognizes that costs and benefits may count even if they are difficult to 
quantify.178  That is, the efficiency thesis values net social welfare, but it 
does not dictate how society defines welfare.  Moreover, many economic 
theorists recognize that efficiency as measured by net social wealth is not 
the sole value that a property regime should serve.179  At the least, 
however, this initial ethical judgment of economic analysis is that, 
because efficiency is an inherent and important value, policymakers and 
judges should ask what rule or result will yield the greatest net social 
utility. 
The second normative aspect of efficiency involves the practical 
meaning of efficiency for purposes of a cost-benefit analysis.  
Economists have developed important technical distinctions about how 
to judge efficiency for different purposes.180  Allocative efficiency, 
which “relates to the distribution of goods and services in an economy to 
maximize social welfare,”181 is especially important to consider in 
property disputes.  As a practical matter, by promoting a cost-benefit 
analysis, the prevailing economic theory recognizes that certain 
allocations or reallocations of resources may be efficient if they result in 
a net gain in social welfare even if some persons are made worse off in 
the process.182  While theoretical debates continue over the meaning of 
efficiency for certain purposes, an economic analysis of law generally 
proceeds from this net cost-benefit approach in determining social 
welfare.183  But within this cost-benefit framework, competing economic 
theories disagree on the exact meaning of efficiency.184 
However efficiency is defined, economic analysis also routinely asks 
whether the marketplace should be able to achieve the efficient result 
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without governmental interference.185  As the economic literature 
adequately demonstrates, however, many complicating factors may 
impede market transactions.186  For example, if the costs of negotiation 
are too high, or if an agreement requires multiple parties to organize and 
collaborate, or if the parties do not have equal knowledge of the relevant 
economic factors, an optimizing transaction may never occur.  Coase 
expressly recognized this problem when he wrote The Problem of Social 
Cost.187  For these reasons, even though neoclassical economic analysis 
commonly favors deference to the marketplace, economists acknowledge 
that market failures may require society to craft economic tools to create 
incentives for the sake of efficiency, and particularly with respect to 
environmental protection.188 
Notice that the polluting factory problem189 involves several 
potentially critical market failures beyond the transaction costs that the 
feuding property owners must incur to negotiate a settlement.  One 
especially disturbing prospect is that the factory may opt to produce at an 
inefficiently high level if the neighbors simply do not have the financial 
ability to pay the factory not to produce more pollution than the positive 
difference between the value of production and the cost of the 
pollution.190  But even if the neighboring landowners have the financial 
resources to pay the factory to limit the pollution, they will only pay 
whatever amount they calculate that a clean environment is worth to 
them.  An environmentalist, therefore, must further object that the cost-
benefit analysis of this problem in the context of a private dispute is 
incomplete because it only accounts for the costs of the pollution by 
considering the damage that the neighboring property owners suffer, and 
then only to the extent that they can identify and evaluate that damage.191  
What about other costs of the pollution, which may be far more 
widespread and difficult to discover or appraise than the immediate 
effects on the neighbors? 
At this point, the relevance of the sustainability thesis begins to 
appear.  For example, the pollution may increase cancer rates even 
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among those who are unaware of the factory, including the unborn, or it 
may poison the water supply for an entire community much larger than 
the neighborhood, or we may only learn years later that the pollution 
helped to destroy a distant recreational area.  To this, the sustainability 
advocate might add the even more substantial harm that the pollution 
may cause to remote future generations, especially when aggregated with 
countless other pollution sources across the globe and over the ages.  For 
reasons such as these, an environmentally aware economist may still 
properly suggest that an economic tool, such as a Pigovian pollution tax, 
is appropriate to adjust for these market failures.192 
Considerations of this kind do not defeat economic analysis; they 
merely demonstrate that the cost-benefit calculus may become extremely 
complex.  To meet the challenge, economists have developed 
sophisticated methods and tools to value risks, quantify intangible 
benefits, adjust for irrational behavior, and even to determine a cost for 
future harms.193  With the help of these innovations, an economic 
perspective unquestionably provides a powerful set of tools for legal 
analysis.  So much so that economic analysis dominates property theory 
in the United States.194  But to maintain that dominance, economic 
theorists must constantly parry their critics’ thrusts.  Any overview of the 
economic analysis of property in the context of sustainability, therefore, 
must consider some of the most relevant criticisms and the responses 
they evoke from the proponents of an economic analysis. 
At a most fundamental level, critics sometimes object that an 
economic analysis fails to explain why efficiency should be a core value 
of a property system.195  From an environmental protection perspective, 
this criticism asserts that an economic analysis of property indefensibly 
presumes the value of exploiting resources to the fullest extent.196  One 
answer to this attack is that it is human behavior and not the economic 
perspective that determines the controlling value of efficiency.  As 
Demsetz explained recently, while economic analysis presumes that 
people recognize the value of efficiency, that presumption does not 
necessarily promote a value judgment about efficiency simply because it 
deduces from observed human behavior “that people respond sensibly to 
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a benefit-cost calculus.”197  In this sense, economic analysis is valid 
because it provides the most powerful analytic framework available for 
predicting what results legal rules will produce, and it suggests how to 
devise legal rules that more efficiently achieve the results that people 
will inevitably pursue.  To the economist, the observation that efficiency 
is good is tautological because economics defines efficiency as the 
course of action that maximizes what human behavior recognizes as 
good. 
A related objection is that economic theory actually advances 
questionable values198 or that it camouflages them as objective, 
quantifiable costs and benefits.199  In response, the economic theorist 
may argue that at both the individual and the collective level, people 
decide which effects count as costs and which count as benefits, as well 
as what weight to assign to any particular effect.200  That is, because 
people define what they value and they act rationally in pursuit of those 
values, economics cannot assign value, although it can predict how social 
institutions can maximize what people perceive as value. 
Other important criticisms are less theoretical and more practical.  
For example, even if economic analysis is fundamentally sound, it may 
be of limited use because the world is far more complex than the theory 
can manage.201  Economic assumptions are especially susceptible to this 
criticism.  We know, for example, that transaction costs are often 
significant, that people rarely have all of the information they need to 
make rational decisions, and that people, including policymakers, 
regularly fail to act completely rationally.202  What is even more 
troublesome is that people often misjudge their own best interests and 
miscalculate or cannot quantify the most important costs and benefits a 
situation presents.203  In the real world, therefore, flawed or inadequately 
informed economic analysis may yield inefficient property rules in the 
same measure that sound economic analysis should produce efficient 
ones.204  Proponents of economic theory, however, rejoin that even with 
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all its flaws, economic analysis offers the best theoretical framework and 
tools for determining the most effective property system that humans can 
currently devise.205  Moreover, because economists recognize the limits 
of their science, they continually work to improve the available 
economic tools.206 
In relation to sustainability, perhaps the most penetrating criticism of 
economic analysis may be that it fails to examine and resolve some key 
normative questions that should inform a property regime.207  From this 
perspective, a property system should do more than understand, reflect, 
or predict human behavior; it should regulate human behavior to achieve 
the proper goals of a virtuous society.  Sustainability theory argues that 
those who own property today must recognize and respect the rights of 
future inhabitants of the earth not because that is the efficient course of 
action, but because it is moral in some entirely different sense.208  In 
contrast, economic discourse sometimes demonstrates a remarkable 
disassociation from ethical questions extraneous to an objective cost-
benefit analysis.  For example, economic analysis may, with apparent 
dispassion, entertain the idea that a rational maximizer of self-interest 
may find satisfaction in, and therefore may assign value to, the misery of 
another person,209 or may be willing to pay a price to discriminate against 
other human beings on the basis of race, religion, or ethnicity.210  In this 
same vein, an economic analysis can provide an argument that it is 
rational for those who currently control natural capital to value their own 
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current consumption over the preferences of those remote in relationship, 
place, and time.  This merely shows that efficiency may be conceptually 
distinguished from a society’s ethics; it does not mean that the two are 
necessarily incompatible.211 
What are the potential theoretical conflicts between sustainability 
and the economic analysis of property?  While it is relatively easy to 
correlate sustainability with traditional theories of property, the task is 
far more difficult when we substitute the economic perspective.  This 
difficulty stems both from the complexity of economic analysis and from 
the need to develop a common language for exploring whether and under 
what circumstances the use of natural resources may be optimal in both 
the economic and the sustainable sense. 
There is, however, no inherent conflict between the goals of 
sustainability and economic efficiency.  While economic theory is 
concerned with the most efficient exploitation of natural resources, 
economics need not dictate how to quantify the costs and benefits that 
flow from a particular use of resources.  Posner illustrates this point 
when he observes that a cost-benefit analysis “merely compels the 
decision maker to confront the costs of a proposed course of action.”212  
In this sense, economic analysis serves its purpose simply by testing 
whether the benefits justify the associated costs.  “If the government and 
the taxpayer and the voter all know—thanks to cost-benefit analysis—
that a project under consideration will save 16 sea otters at a cost of $1 
million apiece, and the government goes ahead, there is no basis in 
economic theory for criticism.”213  This suggests the important 
conclusion that if decision-makers place a sufficiently high value on 
sustainability, economic theory will recognize that choices in favor of 
sustainability may be efficient even if they involve extremely high 
costs.214 
C. Selected Themes from Alternative Theories of Property 
This part considers selected contemporary perspectives on property 
that are not dominated by economic analysis and that seem especially 
relevant to the sustainable development movement.  The common thread 
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of the alternative theories examined in this part is that they define 
property rights within a context of interdependent social relationships, 
and it is this distinction that makes these theories especially useful for 
analyzing potential conflicts between private property and sustainability.  
For convenience, the discussion that follows refers to these perspectives 
as relational theories of property.215 
The most distinctively relational approaches can be nearly dogmatic 
in rejecting the deference to private property rights that characterizes the 
traditional and the economic theories.  But a property theory may 
incorporate relational concepts without becoming radical and without 
rejecting traditional and economic perspectives.  Carol Rose, for 
example, reflects a more inclusive vision in her especially coherent 
characterization of property as a dynamic institution responsive both to 
individual rights and to social relationships.  She offers the following 
synthesis, which can accommodate traditional, economic, and relational 
concepts: “Property regimes always consist of some individual rights, 
mixed with some rights shared with nearby associates or neighbors, 
mixed with still more rights shared with a larger community, all held in 
relatively stable but nevertheless changing and subtly renegotiated 
relationships.”216  Rose’s eclectic approach provides a good starting point 
from which to consider relational theories. 
A critical feature of the relational theories most relevant to 
sustainability is that, at least in certain circumstances, they raise serious 
doubts about the justifications for strong private property rights.  Indeed, 
some relational writers protest that traditional and economic theorists are 
more interested in protecting private property rights than in justifying 
them.217  Traditional property theories, for example, assert that natural 
law, intuition, or quasi-scientific logic provides a sufficient basis for 
private property rights.218  These arguments, as Rose demonstrates, 
amount to little more than defending private property with a “just-so 
story.”219  Because traditionalists tend to see private property as a natural 
consequence of the human condition, if not as a natural right, they are 
more interested in articulating an acceptable explanation for the status 
quo than in engaging in a genuine debate over the just allocation of 
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resources.  Proponents of economic analysis arguably expend even less 
energy on the justification question because economic theory stems from 
a utilitarian morality that requires no greater justification for private 
property rights than the evidence that private property tends to maximize 
aggregate wealth in society.220  In this sense, the economic perspective 
aspires to be more scientific or observational than philosophical or 
normative. 
In contrast to both the traditional and the economic approaches, a 
relational perspective often shines an especially intense spotlight on the 
justification question.  A general theme that emerges via these relational 
theories is that, in a world of interdependent relationships, a property 
regime should serve some central ethical values beyond rationalizing the 
status quo or maximizing wealth.  The relational theories discussed here 
often place social justice at the heart of their analyses, and several reflect 
the critical legal theorist’s advocacy of “an outsider’s stance”221 and a 
“commitment to a more egalitarian society.”222 
By viewing property in the context of interdependent relationships, 
relational theories seek a construct for the social institution of property 
that derives from a common understanding of social justice, especially 
distributive justice.223  One of the most influential and coherent modern 
expositions on justice is John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice,224 which 
advances a notion that Rawls called “justice as fairness.”225  In his 
attempt to take Locke’s social contract theory “to a higher level of 
abstraction,”226 Rawls argued that the just social contract would be an 
agreement made among equals.227  His theory posited “the principles of 
justice for the basic structure of society . . . that free and rational persons 
concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial 
position of equality . . . .”228  According to Rawls, to know justice as 
fairness: 
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[W]e are to imagine that those who engage in social cooperation choose 
together, in one joint act, the principles which are to assign basic rights 
and duties and to determine the division of social benefits.  Men are to 
decide in advance how they are to regulate their claims against one 
another and what is to be the foundation charter of their society.  Just as 
each person must decide by rational reflection what constitutes his 
good, that is, the system of ends which it is rational for him to pursue, 
so a group of persons must decide once and for all what is to count 
among them as just and unjust.  The choice which rational men would 
make in this hypothetical situation of equal liberty . . . determines the 
principles of justice.229 
The Rawlsian theory of justice as fairness is especially relevant to 
the institutions of a just society, one of which is the institution of 
property.  These “principles are meant to answer the question: once we 
view a democratic society as a fair system of social cooperation between 
citizens regarded as free and equal, what principles are most appropriate 
to it?”230  Rawls was deeply interested in the question of inequity, and his 
concept of a “property-owning democracy” incorporates safeguards 
against the excessive concentration of property and wealth.231  His just 
savings principle anticipates significant constraints on private property to 
achieve generational justice.232  Consequently, justice as fairness treats 
property and wealth in ways that contrast sharply with both utilitarianism 
and capitalism.233  But it would go too far to say that Rawls’s social 
contract theory promoted a relational theory of property.  His focus was 
not on interdependent relationships but on how individuals acting freely 
in their own best interests would settle on the principles of justice for 
their society.  Moreover, his principles of justice offered only tentative 
details about the institutions of a just society, and they did not attempt to 
develop a comprehensive property theory at all.234 
What is most important for purposes of this Article is that Rawlsian 
principles of justice contemplate a society designed to maintain a just 
structure throughout all generations.  In considering whether social 
systems are just, Rawls called for intergenerational justice as well as 
justice among those living in society during a single era.235  He gave 
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central importance to the question of distributive justice across 
generations, which he stated in this way: “how are the institutions of the 
basic structure to be regulated as one unified scheme of institutions so 
that a fair, efficient, and productive system of social cooperation can be 
maintained over time, from one generation to the next?”236  He reasoned 
that because “society is to be a fair system of cooperation between 
generations over time, a principle governing savings is required.”237  This 
emphasis on justice for all generations of a society creates a framework 
for thinking of sustainability as an element of justice, an idea that finds 
expression in Rawls’s just savings principle.  For Rawls, the principle of 
just savings meant that social institutions should “make possible the 
conditions needed to establish and to preserve a just basic structure over 
time.”238 
The Rawlsian principles of justice do not, however, expressly 
consider how humans should behave toward nature,239 and they do not 
coordinate directly with contemporary sustainability theory.240  Because 
the just savings principle does not deal explicitly with the natural 
environment, justice as fairness does not sound the ecological theme that 
is central to the sustainability movement.  Also, Rawls’s principles of 
justice do not reflect the global perspective of a sustainability theory. 
In considering intergenerational justice and the principle of just 
savings, Rawls was more concerned with social institutions and capital 
formation within a single political society than with global natural 
resources.  He reasoned that “[e]ach generation must not only preserve 
the gains of culture and civilization, and maintain intact those just 
institutions that have been established, but it must also put aside in each 
period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation.”241  For 
Rawls, just savings might “take various forms from net investment in 
machinery and other means of production to investment in learning and 
education.”242  In developing his just savings principle, therefore, Rawls 
did not have in mind the concept of natural capital as known to the 
sustainability movement.  From his somewhat narrower perspective, 
Rawls held open the possibility that at some point accumulated 
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intergenerational savings might fully satisfy the conditions necessary for 
ongoing just social institutions, at which time “net real saving may fall to 
zero.”243  If advocates of sustainable development are right, no society 
can ever achieve those conditions simply by investing in cultural assets 
and the means of production. 
But even with these limitations in mind, the Rawlsian principles of 
justice not only anticipate the need for sustainability in the institutions of 
a just society, but they also are compatible with a relational theory of 
property.  In particular, Rawls’s argument for a just savings principle 
points toward a theory of sustainability based on generational justice, and 
his analysis of distributive justice is receptive to relational concepts of 
property.  Thus, while the Rawlsian concept of justice did not itself 
directly propose environmental sustainability, nor did it advance a 
relational theory of property, its just savings principle, together with its 
notions of social cooperation and distributive justice, helped to create a 
framework for advancing sustainability as an element of justice within 
relational property theories. 
What is especially significant for present purposes is that a Rawlsian 
concept of justice informs some explicitly relational property theories 
that are particularly relevant to sustainability.  Joseph Singer provides an 
apt example when he contrasts what he calls the citizenship model of 
property with the castle model (a traditional perspective of property as 
private dominion over particular resources) and the investment model (a 
utilitarian or economic perspective).244  What distinguishes Singer’s 
citizenship model is that it “starts from the idea that owners have 
obligations as well as rights.”245  Given this premise, Singer’s analysis of 
property quickly leads to an inquiry about fairness and justice in the 
context of interdependent relationships: 
Part of what it means to be a member of society, to be an owner among 
owners, is to be part of a real or imagined social contract that limits 
liberty to enlarge liberty, that limits property to secure property.  This 
does not mean that obligations are justified merely because they are 
demanded by society; it does mean that the central question is whether 
the obligation is fair or just.246 
Drawing on the Rawlsian concept of justice as fairness, Singer argues 
“that owners are legitimately subject to just obligations and that such 
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obligations are in no way incompatible with the concept of ownership.  
The only question is whether a law limiting the rights of the owner is a 
just obligation.”247  This approach leads to a relational inquiry about 
distributive justice.  “[T]he crucial question is not just the rights of the 
individual owner vis-à-vis the state but the right relationships that must 
be established between the owner and others in the community.”248  
Assuming a global or intergenerational definition of the relevant 
community, the argument for adapting property theory to sustainability is 
obvious. 
In another application of this relationship approach to property 
rights, Singer argued that relationships can even create property rights in 
much the same way that relationships can create contract rights or give 
rise to tort liability.249  Using this perspective, Singer argued that a 
company’s employees and the community in which the company 
operated a manufacturing plant could have a sufficient relationship with 
the plant to give rise to property rights in the face of the company’s plans 
to close the plant.250  He concluded “that we should understand property 
as social relations, rather than through the lens of the free market 
model.”251  This approach places an openly ethical gloss on property used 
for commercial purposes by stressing the interdependence of a business 
enterprise and those it affects.  “The social relations approach asks us to 
be sensitive to the power inequalities within those relationships . . . .  We 
should focus on the various ways in which vulnerable persons rely on 
relationships of mutual dependence.  This perspective will give us a 
deeper understanding of how the legal system regulates economic 
life.”252  More recently, Professor Singer has argued that any legal right, 
and particularly a property right, “should be understood not merely by 
reference to the powers and rights it gives the owner but by reference to 
the impacts of the exercise of those powers on others and the shape and 
character of the social relationships engendered by those rights and 
powers.”253 
In a similar vein, Jennifer Nedelsky insisted that “property really is a 
set of legal rules and norms that structure power and relationships. . . .  
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The rules of property tell us who has to ask whom for what, and how 
much power or powerlessness they will have in their request.”254  In her 
view, the traditional concept of property rights under the U.S. 
Constitution wrongly treated property as “the defining instance of the 
larger problem of securing justice and liberty in a republic.”255  This 
elevated status of property rights produced a “lasting and destructive 
legacy”256 that was “inseparably tied to inequality.”257  She explained the 
errant thinking in this way: 
The link to inequality was liberty.  Property was important for the 
exercise of liberty, and liberty required the free exercise of property 
rights; this free exercise would inevitably lead in turn to an unequal 
distribution of property.  Property thus posed a problem for popular 
government because this inequality required protection; those with 
property had to be protected from those who had less or none. . . .  [I]t 
was in the very nature of a productive system of private property that 
many, perhaps most, would have none.258 
The core problem, Nedelsky concluded, was that this perspective “makes 
inequality rather than liberty, or individual autonomy, the central 
problem of government.”259  Nedelsky’s alternative perspective was a 
radically instrumental vision: 
We need to take our traditional concepts like property and ask what 
patterns of relationship among people and the material world we want, 
what patterns seem true to both integrity and integration.  Those 
questions do not necessarily preclude a concept of property, but they 
imply a focus not on limits but on forms of interaction and 
responsibility for their consequences.260 
From this same theoretical framework, Nedelsky argued: 
[R]elationship, not separation makes autonomy possible.  This 
recognition shifts the focus from protection against others to structuring 
relationships so that they foster autonomy. . . .  Interdependence  
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becomes the central fact of political life . . . .  The whole conception of 
the relation between the individual and the collective shifts: the 
collective is a source of autonomy as well as a threat to it.261 
Some other contemporary property theories emphasize relationships 
between property and individuals rather than relationships within 
communities or society.  A leading example is Margaret Radin’s 
personhood theory of property.262  Drawing on Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right,263 Radin’s analysis “focuses on personal embodiment or self-
constitution in terms of ‘things.’”264  She explained that “[t]he premise 
underlying the personhood perspective is that to achieve proper self-
development—to be a person—an individual needs some control over 
resources in the external environment.  The necessary assurances of 
control take the form of property rights.”265  Radin argued that “the 
personhood perspective is often implicit in the connections that courts 
and commentators find between property and privacy or between 
property and liberty.”266 
Thus, the personhood theory asserts that some measure of private 
property is essential as a matter of human rights.  Social science research 
supports this notion by demonstrating that a person stripped of 
possessions instinctively seeks some control over objects or territory as a 
way of establishing his or her personal identity.267  Because the theory is 
closely connected to a sense of human dignity, it illustrates a strong 
judgment about the role of property in society.  While Radin recognized 
that the personhood perspective does not necessarily offer a 
comprehensive theory of property rights,268 she argued that this 
understanding of property can “serve as an explicit source of values for 
making moral distinctions in property disputes, and hence for either 
justifying or criticizing current law.”269 
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In developing this theory, Radin contrasted strong versus weak 
relationships between individuals and their possessions.  A strong 
personal relationship with an object exists “if its loss causes pain that 
cannot be relieved by the object’s replacement.”270  A much weaker 
relationship exists with respect to “an object that is perfectly replaceable 
with other goods of equal market value.”271  Based on this distinction, 
property to which a person has a strong personal attachment should 
receive greater legal protection than commercial property, which is 
essentially fungible.272  With respect to sustainability, the most 
significant implications of a property theory that emphasizes a 
continuum of property rights ranging from the highly personal to the 
completely fungible is that it might allow relatively greater deference to 
government regulation of privately owned property that falls toward the 
fungible or commercial end of the continuum.  The personhood theory of 
property eventually led Radin to entertain radical arguments for wealth 
redistribution.273  In that sense, her theory would presumably tolerate—
and perhaps it would promote—a sustainability agenda based on social 
justice. 
These few examples of alternative property theories indicate that 
relational perspectives should be receptive to limitations on property 
rights based on the most far-reaching sustainability objectives—much 
more so than are the traditional or the economic approaches.274  The next 
part illustrates that legislatures and courts in the United States operate 
comfortably within traditional and economic models, and it questions 
whether they are prepared to embrace the more relational concepts that 
the sustainability movement may require. 
IV. EXPLORING THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BOUNDARIES OF 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABILITY 
Where sustainability and property interests intersect, the true test of 
the alternative theories discussed in Parts II and III will play out in the 
sustainable development initiatives that survive the legislative process 
and ultimately face judicial scrutiny.  That is, the theoretical distinctions 
with the greatest practical significance will manifest themselves most 
                                                     
 270. Id. at 959. 
 271. Id. at 960. 
 272. Id. at 987–88, 1015. 
 273. Id. at 988–91. 
 274. For a more complete evaluation of sustainability in light of relational theories, see 
discussion infra Part V.C. 
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clearly when government chooses one course of action over another on 
controversial matters affecting sustainability and private property rights.  
As the sustainability agenda begins to encroach more aggressively on 
private property rights, which theories will prevail in the nation’s 
legislatures and courts?  To modulate the analysis from an inquiry about 
abstract perspectives to an examination of concrete decisions, this part 
explores the theories of property and sustainability currently embodied in 
a few prominent statutes and court cases. 
A. The Legislative Context 
Environmental protection legislation that infringes on private 
property rights often gives rise to significant policy debates that highlight 
a legislative commitment to a particular property theory.275  Competition 
in the legislative arena most frequently takes place between traditional 
and economic perspectives on property.  Consider, for example, a debate 
over legislation to protect endangered species, which may either focus on 
the justification for limiting a property owner’s freedom to develop 
protected habitat276 or may ask whether the legislative deliberations 
properly weighed the ecological benefits against the social costs 
involved.277  The justification question may primarily evidence a 
traditional perspective on property, while the second inquiry explicitly 
invokes economic analysis.  In some situations, economic analysis 
dominates.  A recent example dealing directly with sustainability is a 
Washington statute that authorizes public utility districts to mitigate the 
effects of their greenhouse gas emissions through the “purchase, trade, 
and banking of greenhouse gasses offsets or credits.”278  A better known 
example addressing more conventional environmental protection 
involves the well-documented debate over tradable permit programs, 
which use economic models and economic instruments to require 
                                                     
 275. See REVESZ, supra note 18, at 2–49.  See also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 
630–31 (2001) (rejecting a landowner’s regulatory takings claim stemming from the Rhode Island 
Coastal Management Council’s denial of a development application for a waterfront parcel because 
the record reflected that a portion of the property retained development value). 
 276. See Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act and Private 
Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 377–91 (1994) (observing that the habitat areas for listed endangered 
species often conflict with private land ownership). 
 277. See id. at 370 (stating that the ESA weighs “private economic activity against national 
concern for aesthetic, ecological, scientific, and recreational values”); Barton H. Thompson, The 
Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 343–54 
(1997) (explaining that compensation for private landowners has been expanded in recent years). 
 278. WASH. REV. CODE § 54.16.390 (2008).  The statute effectively overrules the result in 
Okeson v. City of Seattle, 150 P.3d 556 (2007), discussed at length infra in Part IV.B.2. 
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industries to internalize the social costs of their polluting activities to 
achieve economic efficiency.279  On environmental issues involving less 
quantifiable costs and benefits, however, legislative policies sometimes 
reflect the far more instinctive approach of traditional property theory, 
under which a rough balancing standard determines when property rights 
must yield to competing public welfare interests.  This more traditional 
perspective presumably informed a legislative decision that directed the 
Environmental Protection Agency to establish air quality standards 
without undertaking a cost-benefit analysis.280 
Current legislative initiatives from the sustainable development 
movement in the United States also invoke both traditional and economic 
theories of property.  For example, municipalities sometimes base green 
building programs on a traditional land use control model that balances 
the rights of developers against the general public interest and the 
welfare of neighboring landowners; but, at other times they adopt 
economic tools directed at perceived market failures.281  For example, the 
growing support for green building codes reflects a traditional land use 
control approach.282  Yet, at the same time, and with even more 
widespread support, cities and counties across the country have been 
crafting economic incentive programs to encourage sustainable 
development.283 
It is more difficult to find environmental initiatives in this country 
that distinctly reflect relational property theories, although the 
international sustainability movement frequently advocates relational 
                                                     
 279. See COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 125, at 332–40 (describing the method for 
mathematically calculating the proper amount of tradable credits to be allocated to a level of 
pollution); EBAN S. GOODSTEIN, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 309–13 (3d ed. 2002) 
(explaining the use of incentive-based regulation via permits or taxation, which put a “price on 
pollution” to help deter corporations and individuals from polluting). 
 280. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 464–77 (2001) (detailing the use of 
economic models in determining realistic guidelines for emission reduction initiatives). 
 281. See generally Circo, supra note 44, at 751–65 (discussing alternative bases for several 
green building ordinances). 
 282. See MAYOR MENINO’S GREEN BUILDING TASK FORCE REPORT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 
(2004), available at http://www.bostongreenbuilding.org/ (follow “Click here to view the Executive 
Summary” hyperlink) (proposing that Boston adopt mandatory green building standards); Press 
Release, U.S. Green Bldg. Council, New Standard to Drive High Performance Bldg. Practices to the 
Mainstream (Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://communicate.usgbc.org/press/2006/02.15.06 
_ashrae/standard189.html (establishing a new standard for high-performance green buildings); see 
generally U.S. GREEN BLDGS. COUNCIL, LEED INITIATIVES IN GOVERNMENTS AND SCHOOLS 
(2009), available at http://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=691 (providing an 
extensive list of jurisdictions that have adopted green building programs, including several that have 
incorporated green building standards into their building codes). 
 283. See Circo, supra note 44, at 756–62 (discussing specific examples of enacted green 
building programs across the U.S.). 
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perspectives.284  To be sure, relational notions influence some of the 
debates over the extent to which property owners have responsibilities 
toward future generations, but there is little evidence that governmental 
sustainability programs in this country will implement a relational 
perspective on property.285  Successful sustainability initiatives generally 
require the legislative body to conclude either that a proposed restriction 
imposes only a limited, reasonable infringement on the traditional ideal 
of exclusive property or that it is justified on a cost-benefit analysis.  
Indeed, as Part V of this Article concludes, there is little basis to expect 
that the relational theories most aligned with sustainability in the strong 
sense will significantly influence legislative policy debates in this 
country. 
B. The Judicial Context 
As the sustainability movement begets more extensive and vigorous 
legislative and regulatory action, courts must determine the 
circumstances under which sustainability considerations authorize the 
government to encroach on private property rights.  What theoretical 
paths will courts explore when sustainability strategies threaten property 
rights?  The balance of this part analyzes three recent cases that provide a 
roadmap.  In the first two cases, the United States Supreme Court 
confirmed its allegiance to traditional property theories, tempered by a 
broad respect for legislative judgments on economic policy.  In the third 
case, a divided Supreme Court of Washington paid homage to an 
ambitious sustainability initiative even while overturning the specific 
program on technical grounds.  The contrasting opinions of the justices 
in the Washington case illustrate alternative judicial perspectives on 
sustainability as public policy.  Thus, although none of the three cases 
discussed here pits property rights against sustainability, taken together, 
they outline the theoretical contours of a property rights clash with 
sustainability. 
                                                     
 284. See HACKETT, supra note 3, at 323 (advocating sustainable development as socially 
responsible); King & King, supra note 8, at 400–01 (2005) (arguing for sustainable development 
standards to achieve distributive justice). 
 285. See Beatley & Collins, supra note 12, at 312 (explaining that a “profound shift towards 
sustainability” requires a complete re-thinking of the use and management of land as a form of 
natural capital). 
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1. Property Theory in the United States Supreme Court’s Takings 
Jurisprudence 
One of the most recent and instructive property rights decisions from 
the United States Supreme Court is Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,286 
decided under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.287  While it 
would be a mistake to assume that the constitutional notion of property is 
exactly coterminous with property theory in the United States, Takings 
Clause cases teach much about prevailing property theories.  Indeed, the 
scholarly debate over property theory in this country frequently takes 
place in the context of constitutional analysis.288  The Lingle case 
reviewed and clarified some of the most fundamental aspects of the 
Court’s implicit property theory. 
Chevron sought a declaratory judgment that Hawaii took Chevron’s 
property by imposing a statutory cap on rent that Chevron and other oil 
companies could charge their lessee-dealers.289  Hawaii adopted the 
measure to protect independent dealers and retail consumers from the 
adverse effects of concentration in the wholesale market for oil products 
in Hawaii.290  The legislation, therefore, proceeded on the assumption 
that a significant market failure unique to Hawaii justified direct 
economic regulation.291  The primary question for the Court was whether 
“government regulation of private property ‘effects a taking if [such 
regulation] does not substantially advance legitimate state 
interests . . . .’”292 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the unanimous Court acknowledged 
that “our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized as 
unified . . . .”293  She concluded, however, that the test applied in each of 
the controlling cases “focuses directly upon the severity of the burden 
that government imposes upon private property rights.”294  Under this 
approach, the Takings Clause requires compensation for any physical 
                                                     
 286. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 287. Id. at 528.  The Takings Clause reads “nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 288. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Takings Clause, Version 2005: The Legal Process of 
Constitutional Property Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 667, 726–44 (2007) (describing recent 
Supreme Court decisions concerning the constitutional aspects of property rights). 
 289. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 533. 
 290. Id. at 532–34. 
 291. See id. at 534. 
 292. Id. at 531 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
 293. Id. at 539. 
 294. Id. 
CIRCO FINAL 11/6/2009  1:33:21 PM 
2009] A NEW THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS? 141 
taking because “permanent physical invasion, however minimal the 
economic cost it entails, eviscerates the owner’s right to exclude others 
from entering and using her property—perhaps the most fundamental of 
all property interests.”295  But when regulation of property rights does not 
involve physical invasion, Justice O’Connor explained, the relevant 
inquiry “aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally 
equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly 
appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.”296  
Whether regulation effects a taking depends on “the severity of the 
burden that government imposes upon private property rights.”297  Unless 
regulation operates as a “complete elimination of a property’s value,”298 
or falls within the special category of an impermissible land use 
exaction,299 the judicial “inquiry turns in large part, albeit not 
exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and 
the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests.”300 
By respecting the sanctity of a property owner’s right to exclude and 
at the same time using a discretionary balancing approach to judge nearly 
any other form of governmental interference with property, the Court 
evidenced a traditional theory: the constitutional notion of property 
protects the owner’s absolute right to exclude others, but, through a 
deferential balancing test that empowers government to interfere with 
property rights in many other ways, it falls far short of enshrining 
property as an individual’s right of “sole and despotic dominion.”301  The 
opinion offers no explicit economic analysis, although the unruly 
balancing standard opens the door to arguments based on the costs and 
benefits involved. 
For present purposes, however, the most significant aspect of Lingel 
concerns the distinction that Justice O’Connor made between the takings 
issue and a due process challenge to government regulation of private 
property.  A regulatory takings claim “presupposes that the government 
has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.”302  Whether the regulation 
satisfies due process requirements “is logically prior to and distinct from 
                                                     
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 546–48 (discussing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) and Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), the leading land use exaction cases). 
 300. Id. at 540. 
 301. BLACKSTONE, supra note 80, at 2. 
 302. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543. 
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the” takings issue.303  With respect to the due process test, Justice 
O’Connor reaffirmed the Court’s 1926 opinion in Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co.,304 “a historic decision holding that a municipal 
zoning ordinance would survive a substantive due process challenge so 
long as it was not ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare.’”305  By repeating and endorsing the Euclid substantive due 
process standard, Justice O’Connor again signaled that the constitutional 
notion of property adheres to the relatively subjective precepts of 
traditional theories, which view property as a fundamental individual 
right, in contrast to the more objective and quantifiable approach of 
economic analysis, which relates the right of property to efficiency. 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Lingle, however, also demonstrates 
that the Court recognizes the legislative prerogative to regulate private 
property rights based on economic principles.  Indeed, the opinion 
adopted a distinctly deferential stance on the economic strategy of 
Hawaii’s rent control legislation.306  A critical problem with the 
“substantially advances” formula, Justice O’Connor explained, was that 
“it would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of state 
and federal regulations—a task for which courts are not well suited.  
Moreover, it would empower—and might often require—courts to 
substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and 
expert agencies.”307  While Lingle involved a takings challenge, the 
reasoning indicates that the Court will also reject any substantive due 
process approach that would overturn government restrictions on 
property rights based on a judicial calculation that the regulation is an 
ineffective device for achieving the legislative objective.  This is most 
evident from the Court’s criticism that, in passing on Chevron’s claim, 
“the District Court was required to choose between the views of two 
opposing economists as to whether Hawaii’s rent control statute would 
help to prevent concentration and supracompetitive prices in the State’s 
retail gasoline market.”308  The trial court’s error was not simply in 
misreading the Court’s takings jurisprudence but, more fundamentally, in 
failing to recognize that courts must defer to legislative judgments about 
                                                     
 303. Id. 
 304. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 305. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 541 (quoting Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 
(1926) (emphasis added)). 
 306. See id. at 543–45. 
 307. Id. at 544. 
 308. Id. at 544–45. 
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the justifications for and efficacy of regulatory actions; the Court stated: 
“We find the proceedings below remarkable, to say the least, given that 
we have long eschewed such heightened scrutiny when addressing 
substantive due process challenges to government regulation.”309 
The net effect of Lingle, therefore, is to preserve a traditional 
perspective on property at the judicial level even while validating an 
economic analysis of property in the legislative arena.310  For 
sustainability, the implication is that even when a court doubts that a 
legislative use of economic analysis or an economic instrument will be 
effective to achieve its intended purpose, the courts should respect the 
legislature’s decision unless the resulting interference with private 
property rights is “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare.”311 
The sharply contrasting opinions of the Justices in another 2005 
Takings Clause case provide further evidence that traditional property 
theories persist in the twenty-first century and that the Court will give 
wide berth to legislative decisions, including those that reflect economic 
judgments.  The Court granted certiorari in Kelo v. City of New 
London312 to decide “whether a city’s decision to take property for the 
purpose of economic development satisfies the ‘public use’ requirement 
of the Fifth Amendment.”313  Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion 
upholding the city’s right to take residential property by eminent domain 
so that a private developer could use the property for commercial 
purposes that could bring economic benefits to the city.314  In 
determining “whether the City’s development plan serves a ‘public 
purpose,’”315 Justice Stevens concluded: “Without exception, our cases 
have defined that concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of 
deference to legislative judgments in this field.”316  In this way, the 
majority opinion reflects the familiar balancing approach of traditional 
property theory under which the individual’s interest in private property,  
 
                                                     
 309. Id. at 545. 
 310. This is not to say that the Hawaii legislature necessarily applied a valid economic analysis, 
which is a question the Court completely avoided.  See id. 
 311. Id. at 541 (quoting Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) 
(emphasis added)). 
 312. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 313. Id. at 477. 
 314. Id. at 488–89. 
 315. Id. at 480. 
 316. Id. 
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while strong, must often yield to the government’s interest in advancing 
social welfare. 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Kelo also evidenced a 
traditional perspective by providing a reminder that U.S. notions of 
property rights require vigilance against the tyranny of majority rule.317  
Justice Thomas’s strident dissent, which repeatedly cited to Blackstone’s 
views on property,318 insisted not only that the Court’s “modern reading” 
of the Public Use Clause ignored its “history and original meaning,”319 
but also that a taking for economic development purposes is especially 
objectionable because it uniquely threatens the individual rights of the 
powerless.320  This latter argument not only reflects a traditional property 
theory, but may even suggest hostility toward any economic analysis of 
individual property rights. 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
Scalia, and Justice Thomas joined, more clearly reflects the traditional, 
intuitive reverence for the private property rights of individuals.  Justice 
O’Connor’s core objection was that if a governmentally endorsed 
economic development plan is a public use, then government may take 
whatever private property it might want.321  Her impassioned conclusion 
evoked a visceral impulse for the sanctity of private property as a matter 
of individual liberty: “The specter of condemnation hangs over all 
property.  Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 
with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a 
factory.”322  Her indignation on behalf of property owners without 
sufficient resources to defend their rights against those with “power in 
the political process” became palpable when Justice O’Connor 
complained: “The Founders cannot have intended this perverse result. 
‘[T]hat alone is a just government,’ wrote James Madison, ‘which 
impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.’”323 
What is most striking about the Lingle and Kelo cases is that all the 
opinions in both cases may be so easily reconciled with a traditional 
theory of property rights.  The analysis behind the holdings in both cases 
                                                     
 317. Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy cautioned that “there may be 
categories of cases in which the transfers are so suspicious, or the procedures employed so prone to 
abuse, or the purported benefits are so trivial or implausible, that courts should presume an 
impermissible private purpose . . . .”  Id. 
 318. Id. at 505, 508, 510 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 319. Id. at 514. 
 320. Id. at 521–22. 
 321. Id. at 494, 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 322. Id. at 503. 
 323. Id. at 505. 
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acknowledged property as a fundamental individual right while also 
recognizing that government has relatively broad power to interfere with 
private property in the interest of the public welfare.  And in discussing 
the constitutional limits on the government’s right to regulate or 
appropriate private property, none of the opinions used economic 
analysis explicitly, and none even hinted at any other alternative property 
theory.  Indeed, the narrow but contentious dispute in Kelo concerned 
only the meaning of the Public Use Clause, a topic on which the justices’ 
disagreements primarily reflected conflicting views on whether public 
use and public purpose are constitutionally equivalent notions. 
2. A Judicial Perspective on Sustainability as Public Policy 
Okeson v. City of Seattle,324 decided by the Supreme Court of 
Washington, arose when Seattle City Light, a municipal utility, adopted a 
plan to use an economic instrument to promote sustainability.325  
Although the case did not involve private property, it addressed some 
key issues that will arise when sustainability programs impinge on 
property rights.  Following the directives of the Seattle City Council, the 
utility implemented a plan to offset greenhouse gas emissions from its 
own operations by paying other generators of greenhouse gases to reduce 
their emissions.326  Utility ratepayers challenged the authority for the 
plan under Washington enabling statutes governing municipal utilities.327  
While the ratepayers argued that the applicable statutes did not empower 
City Light to adopt the program, they conceded that combating global 
warming was a permissible government objective.328  The court went 
further and declared the purpose “a meritorious one.”329  In a significant 
endorsement of sustainability as public policy, the court also concluded 
“that the program may be viewed as a legitimate part of the utility’s 
production of electricity because its purpose is to prevent City Light’s 
production from causing a net increase in global greenhouse gas 
emissions . . . .”330  On the ultimate issue, however, the court struck down 
the plan because it served a general government purpose rather than a 
                                                     
 324. 150 P.3d 556 (Wash. 2007) (en banc). 
 325. Id. at 558. 
 326. Id. at 559. 
 327. Id. at 559–60. 
 328. Id. at 562. 
 329. Id. at 558. 
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proprietary one under the utility enabling statutes.331  On that technical 
basis, the court held that the program could only be funded by the 
taxpayers at large rather than by utility customers in the form of a rate 
adjustment.332 
The debate over City Light’s statutory power to implement its 
sustainability plan at ratepayers’ expense parallels one of the most basic 
property rights questions about intrusive sustainability programs: are 
long-range, global concerns too uncertain and remote to justify 
interference with private property?  “Here, the ratepayers argued that the 
required nexus is missing because global warming has only a slight and 
speculative impact, if any, on City Light’s ability to supply 
electricity.”333  On this point, the court accepted the city’s argument “that 
its authority for the offset contracts does not hinge on proving that a 
specific emission reduction somewhere on the globe translates into more 
snow melt flowing through the city’s hydropower plants.  It is not for us 
to evaluate the scientific merit of the city’s offset contracts.”334 
In acknowledging that the general governmental purpose of the plan 
was valid, the court implicitly accepted the city’s determination, declared 
in a City Council resolution, that “global warming represents a clear and 
increasingly imminent danger to the economic and environmental health 
of the world, and to specific qualities of life for the Seattle area including 
water supply, hydroelectric energy production, air quality, forest health, 
species protection and recreational activities.”335  Relying on the broad 
scope of the police power,336 courts can use a similarly deferential 
attitude to uphold legislative decisions that impose almost any restriction 
on private property rights for the sake of global sustainability. 
Because the Okeson decision turned on the limited statutory powers 
of the utility, the holding does not determine the extent to which a 
general police power action to address global warming may require a 
nexus between the global harm and some local impact.  But the 
concurring and dissenting opinions signal that this issue may be hotly 
debated in future cases.  Concurring in the result, one of the justices 
offered this criticism of the majority’s deference to the city’s global 
objective: “On this record Seattle City Light’s program of paying others 
                                                     
 331. Id. at 558, 563–65. 
 332. Id. at 558. 
 333. Id. at 563. 
 334. Id. at 564. 
 335. Id. at 558. 
 336. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (referring to the police power as 
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not to emit greenhouse gases has about as much effect on global 
warming as making a bonfire out of ratepayers’ hard-earned dollars.”337  
A dissenting justice took the opposite view and argued that the emissions 
offset plan not only served a valid governmental purpose but that it was 
implicitly within the far more narrowly circumscribed powers of a public 
utility.338 
The dissenting opinion in Okeson is especially relevant to the 
broader question of sustainability restrictions on private property.  In 
arguing that the greenhouse gas mitigation plan bore a sufficient nexus to 
the utility’s proprietary functions, Justice Owens advanced an economic 
analysis that could be applied equally to deflect a substantive due process 
attack against government regulation of private property to achieve 
sustainability.  Recall that Lingle reaffirms that substantive due process 
condemns only those property regulations that are “clearly arbitrary and 
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare.”339  Justice Owens criticized the argument 
that even though Seattle City Light could properly pass along to 
ratepayers the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions at the utility’s 
own facilities, it could not mitigate the effects of its operations by paying 
other operators to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.340  In his view, 
“the Seattle City Council’s required mitigation of [greenhouse gases] 
obliged City Light to internalize”341 the costs of its operations, which the 
utility could do “either by reduction of [greenhouse gases] at its own 
facilities or by purchasing offset credits from other facilities.”342  Justice 
Owens argued that the utility’s mitigation plan was justifiable as “[t]he 
less expensive and more efficient internalization method.”343  Using this 
economic analysis, he saw a “strong nexus between the offset program 
and City Light’s express purpose of providing electricity.  Because the 
ratepayers benefit from using the electricity generated by City Light, the 
ratepayers should pay the costs associated with such power 
generation.”344  Justice Owens argued that “promoting efficiency in 
energy generation is a proprietary purpose”345 and that it was not for the 
                                                     
 337. Okeson, 150 P.3d at 565 (Sanders, J., concurring). 
 338. Id. at 565–66 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
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court “to dictate the policies adopted by municipal corporations so long 
as those policies are constitutional and not arbitrary or capricious.”346 
The Washington legislature agreed with Justice Owens’s economic 
analysis.  In a prompt response to the Okeson decision, the legislature 
authorized public utility districts to purchase emissions credits and to use 
other economic instruments to internalize the costs of greenhouse gas 
emissions resulting from their operations.347  A similar economic analysis 
could be used to justify governmental restrictions on private property 
rights enacted in the interest of sustainability. 
3. The Nascent Conflict Between Sustainability and Property Rights 
When read together, Kelo, Lingle, and Okeson forecast the approach 
courts will follow when facing a property rights attack on sustainable 
development controls, especially those governing land use.  A land use 
regulation that bears a rational relationship to the public health, safety, or 
welfare will survive a substantive due process challenge.348  Moreover, 
the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that it will 
defer to nearly any legislative determination that a proposed property 
regulation serves a valid police power purpose.349  Furthermore, when the 
contested government action merely regulates land use without 
physically interfering with possession,350 the adversely affected 
landowner will have no right to compensation in a takings claim absent a 
showing that the restriction “denies [the] owner economically viable use 
of his land”351 or that it imposes burdens that bear an insufficient 
relationship to the regulation’s public benefits.352  In other words, unless 
the regulation virtually prohibits any valuable use of the land, courts will 
use a deferential balancing test to determine how far government 
regulation may go.353  In essence, this approach follows a traditional 
                                                     
 346. Id. 
 347. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
 348. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
 349. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479–83 (2005). 
 350. Virtually any permanent physical invasion, no matter how minor, constitutes a taking.  See 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426–35 (1982) (holding that a state 
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 351. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). 
 352. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (discussing 
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 353. A distinct line of takings cases applies when a land use authority conditions development 
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theory by recognizing that property rights are subject to reasonable 
limits.  Ultimately, these principles strongly suggest that the U.S. 
Constitution should have a high tolerance for sustainable development 
regulations. 
The constitutional analysis does not, however, end the inquiry.  The 
conflict between the majority and the dissenting opinions in Okeson 
serves as a reminder that judicial interpretations may vary radically about 
how far specific enabling statutes authorize governmental bodies to go in 
the interest of sustainability.  Moreover, when state or local governments 
seek to advance sustainability in ways that stretch traditional notions of 
the public health, safety, or welfare, state courts may apply their 
constitutions or the relevant enabling acts in ways that show greater 
deference to property rights than the U.S. Constitution requires.354 
V. EVALUATING SUSTAINABILITY AGENDAS IN LIGHT OF PROPERTY 
THEORIES 
To what extent does sustainability require us to adjust our concepts 
of private property?  Sustainability theory claims that those who exercise 
dominion over natural resources should do so only to the extent they can 
without consuming, exhausting, or injuring those resources.355  In other 
words, every owner is a steward of the natural capital over which he or 
she may exercise dominion.  As a result, the theoretical tension between 
sustainability and private property stems primarily from the difference 
between ownership in usufruct (the temporary right to use property 
without diminishing its future value) and absolute ownership (the 
prototypical, Blackstonian fee simple).356 
                                                                                                                       
It is unclear whether or in what manner these exaction cases may limit the power of land use 
authorities to impose impact fees on developers to offset the presumed burdens that development 
imposes on future generations or the global environment.  See generally JULIAN CONRAD 
JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION 
LAW 594–603 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing land use and preservation in the context of farmland). 
 354. See, e.g., County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 774–87 (Mich. 2004) (ruling 
contrary to the result in the Kelo case on state law grounds); Centene Plaza Redev. Corp. v. Mint 
Props., 225 S.W.3d 431, 433–35 (Mo. 2007) (en banc) (refusing to find that an area was blighted); 
Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 458–60 (N.J. 2007) (no 
authority to redevelop land that was not fully productive); City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 
1115, 1123 (Ohio 2006) (invalidating statute on vagueness grounds and recognizing that economic 
benefits alone are not enough to satisfy the public use requirement); Board of County Comm’rs v. 
Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 647–52 (Okla. 2006) (economic development alone is not enough to satisfy 
public use requirement of Takings Clause). 
 355. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 356. See generally Ellickson, supra note 73, at 1364, 1367–71 (discussing advantages and 
disadvantages of the two types of ownership). 
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As Part II demonstrates, while property under the common law 
tradition presumes that ownership includes a right to consume or 
exhaust, that right has never been absolute.  The concept of property, 
both under the common law and as modified by an array of legislative 
controls, recognizes many limits on the owner’s freedom to use and 
enjoy.  But the concept of property under United States law has not yet 
made significant accommodations specific to sustainability theory.  In 
light of the urgent assertions of the sustainability movement, the time to 
re-examine property theory is here. 
Before considering what modifications sustainability may demand of 
property theory, it is helpful to recognize that many important 
sustainability strategies impose no restrictions on private property.  For 
example, even if the United States enters into international treaties that 
establish aggressive new national goals to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, implementing those goals will not necessarily require 
governmentally imposed restrictions on the ownership or use of private 
property.  The most prominent green building strategies currently being 
implemented across the country to improve energy efficiency illustrate 
this point.  Many of these programs introduce sustainable building 
practices primarily by adopting energy efficient building standards for 
governmental buildings and operations and only incidentally by 
encouraging, without requiring, the private sector to adopt similar 
standards.357  While some sustainability measures impose green building 
standards on private development, others suggest that the government 
need only provide research support, educational programs, and incentives 
to help the private sector explore the business case for voluntarily 
adopting more sustainable construction and building operation 
practices.358  If green building legislation goes only this far, it will 
require no adjustment to our concept of private property. 
At what point might sustainable development standards lead to 
conflicts with property rights?  The answer depends to a great extent on 
the theoretical underpinnings one posits both for the sustainability 
agenda and for the strong commitment under U.S. law to the institution 
of private property.  While the cases explored in Part IV.B offer a 
roadmap for the analysis, it is a map that allows for alternate routes based 
on the competing theories of property and sustainability discussed 
throughout this Article.  As noted in Part IV.A, when a resource 
conservation objective justifies a sustainable development strategy, the 
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 358. Id. at 762–65. 
CIRCO FINAL 11/6/2009  1:33:21 PM 
2009] A NEW THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS? 151 
resulting restrictions on private property generally should raise only the 
same theoretical considerations that ordinary environmentalism present.  
Indeed, as Part III demonstrates, all of the dominant property theories 
tolerate significant restrictions on private property rights in the name of 
resource conservation.  While the law and economics literature supports 
a vigorous debate about the proper approach for determining what degree 
of environmental regulation is optimally efficient, even the most strident 
advocates of a free market recognize the possibility that market failures 
sometimes require regulation in the name of environmental 
conservation.359  As the theoretical framework of sustainability shifts to 
generational justice or social justice, however, the potential for conflict 
intensifies to a greater or lesser extent depending on which property 
theory is applied.  The remainder of this Article explores how the 
different strains of sustainability theory may require adjustments to each 
of the property theories considered in Part III. 
A. Sustainability and Traditional Property Theories 
As already suggested, sustainability as resource conservation 
presents essentially the same issues for traditional property theories as 
does conventional environmental protection.  The police power is 
sufficiently broad to authorize government to impose reasonable 
restrictions on property rights in the name of resource conservation.  The 
leading land use cases reflect the traditional theory that government may 
impose significant, even highly intrusive, restrictions on property rights 
for police power purposes.360  The usual test is that a police power 
imposition on property rights is valid unless it is “clearly arbitrary and 
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare.”361  Notice the two elements involved: the 
limitation on property rights must be for a valid police power function 
(health, safety, morals, or general welfare) and the limitation imposed 
must bear at least some relationship to that police power purpose (must 
not be arbitrary or unreasonable).  While this standard recognizes 
property as a fundamental individual right, it also yields to expansive 
governmental authority to enact property rights restrictions at the federal, 
                                                     
 359. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Free & Green: A New Approach to Environmental Protection, 
24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 658–59 (2001) (noting “that there is no question that the early 
environmental laws seemed to work . . . principally because [they were] plucking low-hanging 
fruit”). 
 360. See supra notes 286–323. 
 361. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
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state, and local levels in the name of resource conservation.  This 
familiar approach that balances competing individual and governmental 
interests ultimately leaves it to courts to determine on a case-by-case 
basis whether a resource conservation measure goes too far.  While it 
may be difficult in a particular circumstance to predict what result a 
balancing standard will produce, sustainability in this relatively weak 
sense requires no adjustment to traditional property theory. 
What of sustainability programs that go beyond a resource 
conservation motive to promote generational justice?  The agendas of 
these programs may raise an issue not inherent in conventional 
environmental regulation: to what extent is equity between the current 
generation and indefinitely remote generations a legitimate police power 
objective?  While the proposed purpose may be novel in the sense that 
the most familiar police power actions generally address present risks to 
the public welfare, it is not significantly more ambitious than many other 
purposes that have survived judicial scrutiny.362  Conventional 
environmental protection programs already recognize preservation of the 
natural environment as a valid police power goal.  For decades, state and 
federal legislatures and courts have applied traditional property theories 
in ways that recognize broad discretion for government to adopt rules 
and restrictions affecting private property in the perceived interest of 
public welfare.363  Programs enacted at the dawn of the modern 
environmental protection era already seek long-term environmental 
preservation.364  There is little reason to expect legislatures and courts to 
be more skeptical about resource conservation strategies simply because 
they emphasize the interests of future generations.  The Supreme Court 
of Washington’s Okeson decision, discussed in Part IV.B, illustrates this 
perspective by holding that “combating global warming is a general 
government purpose.”365  While that case involved the statutory authority 
of a public utility rather than government regulation over private 
property rights, the holding indicates that, at least in some states, 
sustainability in the sense of generational justice should be a valid police 
power purpose. 
                                                     
 362. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 485 (2005) (holding that economic 
development qualifies as a public use for eminent domain purposes); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 
544 U.S. 528, 543–45 (2005) (declining to review the effectiveness of a state rent control law). 
 363. See supra notes 286–323. 
 364. See generally LEBSTER B. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION: DECISION 
FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY (1981), as reprinted in REVESZ, supra note 18, at 85–89 (examining 
different frameworks employed to make environmental regulatory decisions). 
 365. Okeson v. City of Seattle, 150 P.3d 556, 558 (Wash. 2007) (en banc). 
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It is far less likely that traditional property theories will tolerate 
governmental strategies justified primarily by the social justice goal of 
distributive equity, especially when the legislative objective goes beyond 
the interests of current and future residents of the geographic region over 
which the enacting body exercises authority.  The problem here is that 
distributive justice does not figure prominently in either the legislative or 
the judicial bases for current environmental protection laws in the United 
States.366  As already noted, the traditional property theories recognized 
in this country emphasize that individual property rights are subject to 
reasonable limitations in the interest of the general public welfare, but 
they do not generally speak to equity in the allocation of resources, and 
some theorists forcefully argue that our traditional property theories 
inherently support property inequality.367  Sustainability objectives that 
serve the interests of social justice, especially at the global level, seem to 
require significant deviations from traditional perspectives. 
B. Sustainability and Economic Property Theories 
Through its singular emphasis on efficiency, the law and economics 
literature offers abundant principles for validating or rejecting resource 
conservation programs.368  There is no inherent clash between economic 
analysis and sustainability as resource conservation.  The economic 
analysis may, however, sometimes provide a different result than will 
traditional property theory because cost-benefit analysis of resource 
conservation strategies uses more objective and quantifiable tests than 
the balancing-of-interests standard of traditional property theory.  
Additionally, economic analysis generally does not support direct 
government regulation of property rights if the marketplace (regulated or 
unregulated) can achieve the maximum social welfare.369  In the absence 
of significant market failures, economic theory posits that if resource 
conservation contributes more quantifiable value than the costs it 
imposes, there will often be no need for the government to regulate 
private property rights.370  Part III.B has already surveyed the basic 
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economic tenets involved—individual property owners acting in their 
own distinct interests may bargain to the optimal result to achieve the 
greater efficiency of resource conservation, but if transaction costs are 
high, or other market inefficiencies exist, some form of regulation may 
be appropriate.  Unlike traditional property theory, however, economic 
analysis offers sophisticated tools to help policy makers determine what 
specific restrictions or regulations affecting private property are 
justified—or, most efficient.371 
It is more difficult to judge whether economic analysis 
accommodates sustainability programs based on generational justice.  
Perhaps the fact that future generations do not interact with the current 
generation means that an economic approach cannot address the interests 
of multiple generations.  But some theorists argue that the economic 
perspective inherently weighs the interests of future generations 
appropriately.  For example, Ellickson argues that “the preeminent 
advantage of an infinite land interest is that it is a low-transaction cost 
device for inducing a mortal landowner to conserve natural resources for 
future generations.”372  He goes on to extend this proposition to its most 
extreme conclusion by claiming that “benefits and costs from here to 
eternity are capitalized”373 into the marketplace calculations of the self-
interested actor.  Ellickson offers this explanation for his astounding 
claim: 
 Although the assertion may seem counterintuitive, the key to land 
conservation is to bestow upon living persons property rights that 
extend perpetually into the future.  The current market value of a fee in 
Blackacre is the discounted present value of the eternal stream of rights 
and duties that attach to Blackacre.  A rational and self-interested fee 
owner therefore adopts a [sic] infinite planning horizon when 
considering how to use his parcel, and is spurred to install cost-justified 
permanent improvements and to avoid premature exploitation of 
resources.  The fee simple in land cleverly harnesses human selfishness 
to the cause of altruism toward the unborn, a group not noted for its 
political clout or bargaining power.374 
While this logic holds some appeal for decisions that affect future 
periods within the immediate consciousness of current property owners, 
                                                                                                                       
concerns are better cared for when incorporated into market institutions through property rights and 
exchange than left dependent upon government beneficence for protection”). 
 371. See Circo, supra note 44, at 762–65. 
 372. Ellickson, supra note 73, at 1368. 
 373. Id. at 1369. 
 374. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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it fails in the face of the much longer horizons of generational justice 
sustainability.  Even if current land prices capitalize residual land values 
for several future generations, it overstates the practical bounds of 
rational calculation to conclude that they do so perpetually.  Not even the 
most sophisticated buyers of real estate today can acquire the information 
needed to adjust future values to reflect ecological degradation 
threatened many generations into the future.  Moreover, as discussed 
more fully below,375 even if we assume that this information is available, 
we have no standards for selecting a rational discount rate to establish the 
present value of reduced income streams for distant generations.376 
Consider how the market actually prices a parcel of income 
producing real estate.  A discounted cash flow valuation analysis only 
requires a few years’ worth of reasonably reliable revenue projections to 
establish an acceptable present value of the asset that will produce those 
cash flows.377  In other words, the perpetual discounting assumption does 
not reflect how rational bidders for income producing assets actually 
behave in current market transactions.  And even if an investor today 
considers infinitely remote revenue streams, discount rate considerations 
support substantially equal present values for two different parcels if they 
are distinguishable only by their presumed future income potentials at a 
point in the too distant future.378  The reason that global warming has the 
attention of rational investors today is not that the marketplace 
capitalizes projected costs and benefits “from here to eternity.”379  
Rather, it is because, after decades (or more) of gradual degradation, 
global warming finally threatens to impose significant costs in the near 
term rather than only many generations hence. 
In addressing this problem, Posner recognizes that one of the most 
nettlesome issues for the economist concerns selecting an appropriate 
discount rate, which is essential to any cost-benefit analysis involving an 
environmental protection cost incurred today to gain an environmental 
benefit in the distant future.  Posner discusses three possible solutions: 
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One is to use a zero discount rate on the ground that we have no right to 
value the welfare of future generations any less than we value our own 
welfare.  But even if the premise is accepted, the conclusion does not 
follow, for it ignores the possibility of investing the money that we 
would need to implement the regulation and using the interest to fund a 
future project.380 
The second approach would be to use a commercial discount rate, which 
would allow the current generation to compare the costs of investing 
today for the benefit of future generations to the benefits of current 
consumption.381  Because that alternative allows the current generation to 
act selfishly, the third alternative is to make the decision a political one: 
If the government decides that people are being too selfish in deciding 
how much to spend today for the benefit of future generations, it can 
pick a discount rate for use in cost-benefit analysis of its projects that is 
lower than the commercial interest rate; this will automatically weight 
the future more heavily than the market does.382 
But this approach may lead to an inefficient decision to make current 
expenditures that would be better invested in a capital fund for future 
generations. 
Based on the discount rate problem alone, it may well be that present 
value analysis cannot adequately address the generational justice 
objective.  The current generation has insufficient information to select 
from a wide range of defensible discount rates, from zero (a benefit in 
the distant future has the same value as a more immediate benefit) to an 
abnormally high rate (the more remote the future benefit is, the less 
current investment it justifies).  But there is an even more troublesome 
problem with using economic analysis to decide whether to address 
future ecological harm now or in the future: economic analysis cannot 
predict the extent to which, at any cost, “natural capital can be increased 
through human activities.”383  While environmental economists have 
recently proposed intriguing theoretical models for valuing natural 
capital,384 at least for now, economic analysis does not seem to have the 
tools needed to administer a sustainability agenda based on generational 
justice. 
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To the extent that social justice, rather than generational justice, 
provides the theoretical basis for sustainability, current economic 
analysis seems even less adaptable.  This is because distributive justice, 
at least when based on a Rawlsian notion,385 is largely exogenous to the 
usual economic analysis.386  And even if some schools of economic 
analysis concede that a regime may properly seek social justice, the 
economic approach may still prefer property rules that maximize total 
social welfare without regard to distributive justice.387  After crafting a 
property system for that singular purpose, society may then use other 
devices, such as a taxing strategy or welfare programs to redistribute 
wealth, but only if those devices will not have the effect of reducing total 
social wealth.388  This seems to suggest that sustainability based on social 
justice, especially of the global variety, is incompatible with the 
dominant applications of an economic analysis of law that currently 
influence the scholarly literature on U.S. law.  In sum, a social justice 
model of sustainability implies highly problematic adjustments in the 
economic analysis of property. 
C. Sustainability and Relational Property Theories 
Whether founded on resource conservation, generational justice, or 
social justice, sustainability seeks a property regime that is less tied to 
concepts of individual liberty than are the tenets of either the traditional 
or the economic theories of property.389  Moreover, sustainability 
promotes a stewardship vision that seeks to impose obligations on those 
who control resources by emphasizing their relationships with other 
inhabitants of the earth, both current and future.390  By its nature, 
sustainability promotes a collectivist value system that incorporates a 
third-world perspective.391  All of these characteristics of sustainability 
tend to be more consistent with a relational framework than they are with 
either the traditional or economic theories of property.392 
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The special connection between sustainability and relational tenets of 
property is least evident when sustainability derives solely from resource 
conservation, because that relatively weak form of sustainability merely 
argues that those who control natural resources today should avoid 
wasting or unreasonably degrading those resources to the detriment of 
future generations.  Resource conservation does not necessarily require a 
relational perspective on property ownership except in the same sense 
involved in the traditional areas of nuisance law393 or land use 
controls.394  In other words, while a relational framework is receptive to 
resource conservation, it is no more so than are the traditional and 
economic property theories. 
By contrast, generational justice insists that the current occupants of 
this earth must preserve the earth’s natural capital for future 
generations.395  In effect, generational justice argues for limited 
individual property rights based on the usufruct model rather than the fee 
simple model of the traditional and economic theories of property.396  
Ownership in usufruct should be a comfortable concept for those 
relational theories that argue that control over property creates 
relationships that produce duties as well as rights.  Therefore, the 
relational principles advanced by such theorists as Singer and Nedelsky 
should be particularly helpful to the generational justice basis of 
sustainability because they argue that a property regime should not only 
create rights in the owner but also should impose obligations toward 
those affected by the owner’s control over and use of property.397 
Finally, a relational approach is far more compatible with a social 
justice framework of sustainability than is any other property theory.  In 
contrast to the traditional and economic perspectives, many relational 
theories embrace distributive justice principles.398  In keeping with ideals 
of distributive justice, a relational approach to property rights argues that 
because individuals acquire and exercise property rights in social 
contexts rather than in isolation, the interrelationships among members 
of society attach duties to property rights for the collective benefit of the 
social institutions in which those rights exist.  As a result, a relational 
theory can conceive of the autonomous individual as a citizen who may 
have spatially global and temporally perpetual stewardship 
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responsibilities.  What is even more important is that a relational 
perspective can be used to argue that property rights at a base level are a 
matter of human rights.  If every person, without regard to time or place, 
deserves that level of property essential for human dignity, significant 
restrictions on the property rights of the relatively wealthy may be 
necessary to secure and protect human rights for all persons throughout 
all geographic regions and socio-economic circumstances and for all 
generations.  Nedelsky, for example, argues that both traditional and 
economic theories improperly link individual liberty or autonomy with 
the jealous protection of private property rights.399 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Does sustainability challenge the U.S. property regime?  The answer 
is yes, but in incremental ways that differ significantly depending on the 
underlying theoretical justification offered for sustainability.  
Sustainability as resource conservation may be easily reconciled with 
both the traditional property framework that still prevails in judicial 
analysis and with the economic analysis that now dominates in many 
academic circles and that heavily influences the legislative arena.  
Additionally, traditional property theory may be sufficiently malleable 
and subjective to accept a generational justice basis for sustainability.  
By contrast, whether or not an economic analysis of property will 
recognize generational justice depends on the current and future work of 
economists on complex topics such as valuing natural capital.  Overall, 
the concept of property in the United States embodies sufficiently 
eclectic perspectives to accommodate much that sustainability demands.  
But what are the prospects in this country for a sustainability agenda 
based on social justice?  Neither the traditional nor the economic 
approaches to property seem receptive.  While relational property 
theories embody principles more consistent with a social justice model of 
sustainability, relational theories remain marginal in both our judicial and 
legislative processes. 
These conclusions suggest that effective sustainability programs and 
strong property rights can coexist in the United States, but not 
necessarily at the level the international sustainability movement 
promotes.  The critical question is whether U.S. sustainability advocates 
can muster the theoretical support they need to achieve their social 
justice objectives.  For now, at least, it seems they cannot. 
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